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Article
The Evolution and Jurisprudence of
The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court and
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review
Laura K. Donohue*

ABSTRACT: The past eight years have witnessed an explosion in the number of publicly-available
opinions and orders issued by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court and Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Court of Review. From only six opinions in the public domain 1978–2012, by early 2021,
eighty-eight opinions had been released. The sharp departure is even more pronounced in relation to
orders: from only one order declassified during 1978–2012, since 2013, 288 have been formally
released. These documents highlight how the courts’s roles have evolved since 2004 and reveal four
key areas that dominate the courts’ jurisprudence: its position as a specialized, Article III court; the
effort to understand the existing statutory language in light of new and emerging technologies; the
tension among constitutional rights, the need for information, and the implications of increasingly
broad surveillance programs; and the courts’s growing role in conducting oversight and having to
respond to Executive Branch errors, noncompliance, and misrepresentations. This Article details these
tensions in light of the courts’ jurisprudence, noting the areas where we are likely to continue to see
concerns in the implementation of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act going forward.

I. Introduction
In 1978, Congress passed the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) to govern domestic
electronic intercepts undertaken for foreign intelligence purposes.1 The statute represented the
culmination of years of hearings directed to understanding the scope of surveillance programs
conducted with little to no oversight that had resulted in the collection of significant amounts
of information on U.S. citizens.2 It also reflected the U.S. Supreme Court’s determination that
*

Professor of Law, Anne Fleming Research Professor, and Director, Center on National Security and the Law,
Georgetown Law. All FISC/FISCR opinions and orders cited in the Article have been declassified and released.
They are available at the Foreign Intelligence Law Collection, which was built by the author, Jeremy McCabe,
and Leah Prescott, and is hosted by Georgetown Law Library at
https://repository.library.georgetown.edu/handle/10822/1052698 [https://perma.cc/68BH-AWZS]. I am
grateful to Jeremy McCabe, at the Georgetown Law Library, for his help in cite checking the Article and to Judge
James E. Boasberg for his comments on an earlier draft.
1 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-511, 92 Stat. 1783 (codified as amended at 50
U.S.C.A. §§ 1801–85c (West)).
2 See e.g., Intelligence Activities: S. Res. 21: Hearing Before the S. Select Comm. to Study Governmental
Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities of the United States, 94th Cong., vol. 5, at 1 (1975); 124
CONG. REC. 34,845 (1978) (statement of Sen. Kennedy); S. REP. NO. 94-755 (1976) (the Church Committee
reports, divided into six books); THE UNEXPURGATED PIKE REPORT: REPORT OF THE HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON
INTELLIGENCE, 1976 (Gregory Andrade Diamond ed., 1992),
https://archive.org/details/PikeCommitteeReportFull/page/n103/mode/2up [https://perma.cc/3ZCJUWJ3]; Laura K. Donohue, Bulk Metadata Collection: Statutory and Constitutional Considerations, 37 HARV.
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the Fourth Amendment prohibited the government from undertaking surveillance for domestic
security purposes absent independent judicial oversight.3
The statute created two specialized Article III courts: the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Court (FISC) and the (appellate) Foreign Intelligence Court of Review (FISCR).4 The FISC’s
role was to review applications for electronic surveillance to determine whether probable
cause existed that the target to be placed under surveillance was a foreign power or an agent
of a foreign power, and whether the individual was likely to use the facility to be placed under
surveillance, prior to issuing orders.5
During the first two years that FISA operated, the Department of Justice (DOJ) conducted
warrantless physical searches outside of the statutory framing. But in 1980, it adopted a new
approach, in which it applied to the FISC for orders to approve nonconsensual physical
searches of personal (not real) property.6 In each case, the Justice Department asserted that the
search in question would have required a warrant in a law enforcement context.7 The court
issued the orders without any accompanying opinions. In October of that year, however, the
Presiding Judge of the FISC submitted a memorandum that the Court’s Legal Adviser had
prepared, concluding that the FISC had no authority to issue orders approving a physical
search or the opening of mail.8
In 1981, the Justice Department, now under the Reagan Administration, submitted an
application to the FISC to issue an order approving physical search of nonresidential premises
under the direction and control of a foreign power as well as personal property of agents of a
foreign power located on the premises.9 The government simultaneously submitted a
memorandum of law explaining that the court lacked jurisdiction over the request.10 Assuming
that the court denied the application, if Congress wanted to bring such searches within FISA,
it would have to amend the statute. Otherwise, the Executive Branch could proceed on the
basis of its own, independent authority. The court, as expected, declined to issue an order
approving the application on the grounds that it lacked any statutory, implied, or inherent
authority or jurisdiction to issue orders approving for physical search or mail opening.11 The
full court concurred in the judgment.12 It did not address the merits of the government’s claim

J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 757, 767–83 (discussing the history leading to heightened protections afforded to domestic
collection of U.S. citizens' information) (2014).
3 See United States v. U.S. Dist. Ct., 407 U.S. 297, 317-22 (1972) (finding government’s security concerns did
not justify departure from requirement of judicial approval prior to a search or surveillance).
4 50 U.S.C.A. § 1803(a)–(b); see also In re Ops. & Ords. of this Ct. Addressing Bulk Collection of Data Under
the Foreign Intel. Surveillance Act, No. Misc. 13-08, GID.C.00127, at 6 (FISA Ct. Jan. 25, 2017) (Collyer, J.); In
re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717, 731, GID.CA.00001, at 731 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2002) (per curiam); United States v.
Cavanaugh, 807 F.2d 787, 792 (9th Cir. 1987); In re Kevork, 634 F. Supp. 1002, 1014 (C.D. Cal. 1985), aff’d,
788 F.2d 566 (9th Cir. 1986).
5 50 U.S.C.A. § 1805(a); 124 CONG. REC. 35,389 (statement of Sen. Mathias).
6 S. REP. NO. 97-280 (1981), at 3.
7 Id.
8 Letter from Hon. George L. Hart, Jr., presiding judge, U.S. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, Oct. 31,
1980, cited in S. REP. NO. 97-280 (1981), at 3, n. 3.
9 S. REP. NO. 97-280 (1981), at 4.
10 Id.
11 In re Application of the United States for an Ord. Authorizing the Physical Search of Nonresidential Premises
and Pers. Prop., at 16-19 GID.C.00001 (FISA Ct. June 11, 1981) (Hart, J.), reprinted in S. REP. NO. 97-280
(1981).
12 Id.
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that it had the independent authority to undertake such actions. Although the Senate in 1981
considered amending the statute to take account of physical search, it did not do so.13
Thirteen years later, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) arrested Aldrich Hazen Ames,
a Central Intelligence Agency counterintelligence officer suspected of being a KGB agent.14
The Attorney General, citing national security, approved a warrantless search of his home
outside of either FISA or ordinary criminal provisions. Ames pled guilty before the case went
to trial, but the Clinton Administration was sufficiently concerned about the legality of the
search as to seek to amend the statute.
The 1995 Intelligence Authorization Act, accordingly, altered FISA to allow for warrantless,
covert physical searches when targeting “premises, information, material, or property used
exclusively by, or under the open and exclusive control of, a foreign power or powers.”15 For
property not under exclusive control of foreign powers, the statute requires an application to
the FISC. The requirements parallel those for electronic surveillance, including the probable
cause requirements.16 In February 1995, President Bill Clinton issued an Executive Order
extending certification authority in support of physical search applications submitted to the
FISC to the Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, and the Director of Central Intelligence,
as well as their deputies and the Director of the FBI.17
Congress subsequently added two more types of foreign intelligence collection to what has
come to be known as “Traditional FISA.” In 1998, Congress provided for the first by
authorizing the acquisition of pen register and trap and trace (PRTT) data for foreign
intelligence or international terrorism investigations.18 In 2001, Congress extended PRTT
beyond telephone numbers to empower the government to obtain any “dialing, routing,
addressing, or signaling information” identifying the source or end point of a
communication—including those that travel via email or through the internet.19 Further
changes in 2006 allowed the government to obtain subscriber records relating to past calls, as
well as real-time information.20
The second additional type of collection stemmed from the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing.
During the investigation, it was unclear whether the FBI had the authority to obtain business
records related to a Ryder truck and a storage locker in Arizona that Timothy McVeigh, the
Oklahoma City bomber, had rented. So in 1998, Congress expanded FISA to allow the
government to obtain records from “a common carrier, public accommodation facility,
13

S. REP. NO. 97-280 (1981), at 8. It continued to keep the matter under advisement. See S. REP. NO. 98-660
(1984), at 24.
14 See Complaint, United States v. Ames, No. 94-cr-00166 (E.D. Va. Feb. 21, 1994),
https://cryptome.org/jya/ames.htm [https://perma.cc/KP6U-VR69].
15
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995, Pub L. No. 103-359, sec. 807(a)(3), § 302(a)(1)(A)(i), 108
Stat. 3423, 3444 (1994) (codified at 50 U.S.C.A. § 1822(a)(1)(A)(i)). There must be no substantial likelihood that
the facilities targeted are the property of a U.S. person. Id. § 1822(a)(1)(A)(ii).
16 Id. § 1823.
17 Exec. Order No. 12,949, 60 Fed. Reg. 8169 (Feb. 9, 1995).
18 Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999, Pub. L. No. 105-272, §§ 601–02, 112 Stat. 2396, 2404–12
(1998) (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C.A. §§ 1841–46, 1861–64). Previously, although the Government could
request (and the court could issue) orders authorizing pen register and trap and trace devices (PRTT), it could
only do so by going through the application procedures that enabled the government to obtain electronic content.
See Donohue, supra note 2, at 793.
19 USA PATRIOT ACT of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 216, 115 Stat. 272, 290 (codified as amended at 18
U.S.C.A. § 3127).
20 USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-177, § 128(a), 120 Stat. 192,
228 (2006) (codified at 50 U.S.C.A. § 1842(d)).

3

physical storage facility, or vehicle rental facility.”21 The Director of the FBI, or a designated
high-ranking official, had to state that the records are sought for an “investigation to gather
foreign intelligence information or . . . international terrorism.”22 The application also had to
include “specific and articulable facts” as to why the person to whom the records pertain are
a foreign power or an agent thereof.23 (These last two requirements no longer apply.)
Under Traditional FISA, from 1978 to 2001, the FISC essentially functioned as a warrantgranting body, issuing more than 14,000 orders and just one public opinion.24 Applications
were sealed and procedures conducted in camera and ex parte.25 No additional opinions—and
no orders—ever saw light of day. The Oklahoma City-derived provision, for its part, saw little
use: between 1998 and 2001, the FBI only obtained one FISA order for business records. But
following the attacks of 9/11, that all changed.
The 2001 USA PATRIOT Act altered FISA in several ways: in addition to amending PRTT,
it introduced temporary provisions to allow for roving wiretaps; changed the duration of
certain orders; increased the number of judges; and amended the definition of “electronic
surveillance.”26 By far, the most significant alterations though were the expansion of the
business records provision in Section 215 to incorporate requests for any tangible goods, as
well as the insertion of the word “significant” into the purpose for which FISA’s electronic
intercepts could be sought.27 The latter, together with a provision that authorized coordination
between intelligence and law enforcement—and a prominent case that came before the FISCR
in 2002—brought down the wall that had previously existed within the Department of Justice
between foreign intelligence collection and criminal investigations.28 In 2004, Congress
further amended the statute to incorporate temporary “lone wolf” powers, permitting the
surveillance of non-U.S. persons engaged in international terrorism, without requiring
evidence linking those persons to an identifiable foreign power or terrorist organization.29

21

Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999 sec. 602, § 502, 112 Stat. at 2411.
Id.
23 Id. Just two months before the Oklahoma City attack, President William J. Clinton issued Executive Order
12,949, which expanded the use of FISA for physical searches. See Exec. Order No. 12,949, 60 Fed. Reg. 8169
(Feb. 9, 1995).
24 FISA Annual Reports to Congress, 1979–2002, Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, FED’N AM. SCIENTISTS,
https://fas.org/irp/agency/doj/fisa/ [https://perma.cc/Z4QH-73A3] (last updated July 28, 2020); In re Application
of the United States for an Order Authorizing the Physical Search of Nonresidential Premises and Pers. Prop.,
GID.C.00001 (FISA Ct. June 11, 1981) (Hart, J.), reprinted in S. REP. NO. 97-280, at 16-19 (1981).
25 In re Motion for Release of Ct. Recs., 526 F. Supp. 2d 484, 488 n.12, GID.C.00021, at 6 n.12 (FISA Ct. 2007)
(Bates, J.). The law provides special protections for U.S. persons, who can only be considered an “agent of a
foreign power” when the government has evidence of some level of criminality on a par with criminal law. 50
U.S.C.A. § 1801(b)(2); see also Donohue, supra note 2, at 789–90. Even then, further minimization procedures
apply. 50 U.S.C.A. § 1801(h)(2). Where special non-judicial procedures targeting non-US persons are used, the
Attorney General can only authorize collection where there is “no substantial likelihood” that citizens’
communications will be obtained or that the search will involve the “premises, information, material, or property
of a” U.S. person. 50 U.S.C.A. § 1822(a)(1)(A)(ii). In the event that a citizen’s communications or property are
involved, the government must obtain a court order within 72 hours before the information or property in
question can be “disclosed, disseminated, or used for any purpose.” 50 U.S.C.A. § 1801(h)(4) (electronic
surveillance); id. § 1821(4)(D) (physical search).
26 USA PATRIOT ACT of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, §§ 206–08, 214, 504, 1003, 115 Stat. 272, 282-83, 286-87,
291, 364–65, 392 (§§ 206 (roving wiretaps), 207 (duration of orders for non-US persons), 208 (expanding FISC
to 11 judges), 214 (amending PRTT), 504 (authorizing coordination), 1003 (amending the definition)).
27 Id. §§ 215, 218, 115 Stat. at 287–88, 291.
28 In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717, GID.CA.00001 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2002) (per curiam).
29 Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-458, § 6001, 118 Stat. 3638, 3742.
22
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Despite Congress’s explicit direction in 1978 that FISA be the sole means for conducting
domestic surveillance for foreign intelligence purposes, following 9/11, the Bush
Administration instituted a program entirely outside the FISA framework. STELLARWIND
intercepted the contents of certain domestic and international telephone calls and Internet
communications, as well as telephony and Internet metadata. Starting in 2004 with Jack
Goldsmith’s arrival at the Office of Legal Counsel, the Justice Department began to try to
shoehorn some of the existing intelligence collection into the FISA framing. The statute,
though, had been designed to ensure that surveillance could only be undertaken with particular
targets in mind. Even with the USA PATRIOT Act changes, it took creative legal
interpretations to find a way to bring parts of the program within FISA.30
The ill-fitting nature of bulk collection programs in the existing statutory framing prompted
further statutory revision and ushered in what is colloquially referred to as “Modernized
FISA.” The 2008 FISA Amendments Act (FAA) added a new provision (Section 704), which
provided for the acquisition of the communications of U.S. persons located outside the United
States—a category that previously fell within the guidelines set by Executive Order 12333.
Simultaneously, two other provisions liberalized the FISA rules for targeting individuals
outside the United States, with Section 702 providing for the domestic collection for non-U.S.
persons, and Section 703 for U.S. persons, reasonably believed to be outside the United
States.31 The statute empowered the Attorney General and the Director of National Intelligence
to jointly authorize (without court approval), for up to one year, the targets of such intercepts.32
These changes significantly altered the courts’ role. Instead of just issuing orders targeted at
particular individuals inside the U.S., the FISC and FISCR now monitor programmatic
collection of international electronic communications.33 The courts tackle questions related to
jurisdiction, separation of powers, and the rule of law. They wrestle with how to understand
new technologies in light of old statutory language, and they engage in complex analysis to
apply the fourteen statutes that now constitute FISA.34 The courts routinely confront difficult
First, Fourth, and Fifth Amendment questions that impact the lives of every person in the
United States, as well as certain individuals overseas.35 And they have to police an Executive
that makes technical errors, fails to comply with court orders, omits critical information, and
makes misrepresentations to the court.36 Instead of just issuing orders approving applications,
30

See generally LAURA K. DONOHUE, THE FUTURE OF FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE: PRIVACY AND SURVEILLANCE IN A
DIGITAL AGE (2016).
31 FISA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-261, §§ 702–04, 122 Stat. 2436, 2438–57 (codified as
amended at 50 U.S.C.A. §§ 1881a–c (West)).
32 Certain restrictions apply. See id.
33 The courts also became enmeshed in considering bulk collection of domestic and international
communications, until subsequent statutory changes prohibited such collection for telephony metadata. See
Donohue, Bulk Metadata Collection, supra note 2.
34
See, e.g., Supplemental Opinion, In re Prod. of Tangible Things, No. BR 08-13, GID.C.00033 (FISA Ct. Dec.
12, 2008) (Walton, J.).
35 See, e.g., In re Proc. Required by Section 702(i) of the FISA Amends. Act of 2008, No. Misc 08-01,
GID.C.00028, 2008 WL 9487946 (FISA Ct. Aug. 27, 2008) (McLaughlin, J.) (First and Fourth Amendments);
Opinion on Motion for Disclosure of Prior Decisions, [REDACTED], No. [REDACTED], GID.C.00112 (FISA
Ct. 2014) (Collyer, J.) (Fifth Amendment); Memorandum, In re Application of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation for an Order Requiring Production of Tangible Things from [REDACTED], No. BR 13-158,
GID.C.00086 (FISA Ct. Oct. 11, 2013) (McLaughlin, J.) (First and Fourth Amendments); In re Sealed Case, 310
F.3d 717, GID.CA.00001 (Fourth Amendment).
36 See, e.g., Supplemental Opinion and Order, In re Application of the FBI for an Ord. Requiring the Prod. of
Tangible Things [REDACTED], No. BR 09-15, GID.C.00048, at 3–4 (FISA Ct. Nov. 5, 2009) (Walton, J.) (NSA
sent query results to email list of 189 analysts, “only 53 of whom had received the required training”);
[REDACTED], No. [REDACTED], GID.C.00073, at 15–18, 78–80, 2011 WL 10945618, at *5–6, *28 (FISA Ct.
Oct. 3, 2011) (Bates, J.) (NSA misled Court, violating FISA and the Fourth Amendment); Memorandum
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the FISC routinely issues opinions, which the Executive Branch, amici, non-specialized
Article III judges (and their clerks and parties before them), cite to as precedent.37 This is not
the role that Congress envisioned for the FISC/FISCR in 1978.
An important and robust body of law is now emerging from a court that, for decades, has been
largely shielded from public inspection. As shown in Figures 1 and 2, nearly ninety
declassified FISC/FISCR opinions and 290 orders are now in the public domain, as are
hundreds of FISC/FISCR filings.38
Previously Classified FISC/FISCR Opinions
by month of declassification and release
Month

January
February
March
April
May
June
July
August
September
October
November

Pre2013
6

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

2018

1

6

2

3
3
1
2

3
4

3
1
1

2
1
12

1
1

2020

1
2
1

1

7
1

2019

7
1

6
3

1

1

Opinion, [REDACTED], No. [REDACTED], GID.C.00092, at 3, 18, 100–05 (FISA Ct.) (Bates, J.) (“NSA
exceeded the scope of authorized acquisition continuously during the more than [REDACTED] years of
acquisition”; FBI, CIA, and NCTC “accessed unminimized U.S. person information”; NSA disseminated “reports
containing U.S. person information”; government requested permission to violate law); Memorandum Opinion,
[REDACTED], No. [REDACTED], GID.C.00078, at 26–27 (FISA Ct. Sept. 25, 2012) (NSA misrepresented
upstream collection, acquiring U.S. person domestic communications).
37 For FISC/FISCR reference to prior opinions as precedent, see, e.g., In re Directives to Yahoo! Inc. Pursuant to
Sec. 105B of Foreign Intel. Surveillance Act, 551 F.3d 1004, 1010, GID.CA.00002, at 13, 15 (FISA Ct. Rev.
2008) (Selya, J.); Memorandum, In re Application of the FBI, No. BR 13-158, GID.C.00086, at 4–5 (analyzing
Judge Eagan’s constitutional analysis in the context of the Supreme Court’s recent decision in United States v.
Jones); see also Memorandum Opinion, [REDACTED], No. [REDACTED], GID.C.00092, at 6, 74–75;
Memorandum Opinion, In re Application of the FBI for an Ord. Requiring the Prod. of Tangible Things from
[REDACTED], No. BR 14-96, GID.C.00103, at 2–3 (FISA Ct. June 19, 2014) (Zagel, J.); Amended
Memorandum Opinion, In re Application of the FBI for an Ord. Requiring Prod. of Tangible Things from
[REDACTED], No. BR 13-109, GID.C.00083, at 19–20 (FISA Ct. Aug. 29, 2013) (Eagan, J.). For similar
references by the U.S. Department of Justice, see, e.g., Defendants’ Memorandum of Law in Opposition to
Plaintiffs’ Motion for a Preliminary Injunction at 16, Am. C.L. Union v. Clapper, 959 F. Supp. 2d 724 (S.D.N.Y.
2013), aff’d in part, vacated in part, remanded, 785 F.3d 787 (2d Cir. 2015), 2013 WL 5744828 (“[S]ince May
2006, fourteen separate judges of the FISC have concluded on thirty-four occasions that the FBI satisfied this
requirement, finding ‘reasonable grounds to believe’ that the telephony metadata . . . ‘are relevant to authorized
investigations.’”) (citation and quotation omitted); United States’ Legal Brief to the En Banc Court in Response
to the Court’s Order of March 22, 2017 at 1, In re Ops. & Ords. of this Ct. Addressing Bulk Collection of Data
Under the Foreign Intel. Surveillance Act, No. Misc. 13-08 (FISA Ct. Apr. 17, 2017),
https://repository.library.georgetown.edu/bitstream/handle/10822/1056062/Misc%25201308%2520United%2520States%2527%2520Legal%2520Brief%2520to%2520the%2520En%2520Banc%2520Co
urt.pdf [https://perma.cc/WKA5-CT8P ] (“It is well-settled that there is no First Amendment public right of
access to the proceedings, records, and rulings of this Court,” citing to four FISC opinions and orders in support.)
38 More than two decades after its 1981 opinion, the Court issued two opinions. In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717,
GID.CA.00001; In re All Matters Submitted to Foreign Intel. Surveillance Ct., 218 F. Supp. 2d 611,
GID.C.00002 (FISA Ct. 2002), rev’d by In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717, GID.CA.00001. It published two more
opinions between 2007 and 2008. In re Directives to Yahoo!, Inc Pursuant to Sec. 105B of Foreign Intel.
Surveillance Act, 551 F.3d 1004, GID.CA.00002 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2008) (Selya, J.); In re Motion for Release of
Ct. Recs., 526 F. Supp. 2d 484, GID.C.00021 (FISA Ct. 2007) (Bates, J.).

6

December
Total

6

2
17

9

1
6

4

18

14

3

11

Figure 1

Previously Classified FISC/FISCR Orders
by month of declassification and release
Month

January
February
March
April
May
June
July
August
September
October
November
December
Total

Pre2013
1

2013

1
2
8
3
2
1

16

2014

24
1
1
51
2
3
3
7
11
1
1
8
113

2015

2016

4

1
1
16

2
2
1
2
1

2017

2018

2

12
1

4
5
2
18

1

19

2020

1

4
6
5
4

2
1
2
28

14
1

1
13

2019

46

3

43

3
7

5
1
1
1
30
Figure 2

The timing and pattern of the declassification of the courts’ opinions and orders illustrate the
suddenness with which the courts have found themselves in the public eye.
It would be hard to overstate the importance of the documents leaked by Edward Snowden in
June 2013 in driving this phenomenon. They took the study of foreign intelligence from a
niche, classified legal specialization to a matter of public discourse. By the end of the year,
nine new opinions and sixteen orders had been formally declassified and released by the
government, in sharp contrast to just six opinions and one order that had been released over
the previous 35 years of the statute’s existence. Similarly, from zero public filings prior to
June 2013, within five months of the Snowden leaks, the FISC’s public docket had exploded.39
These filings put the courts in the position of having to determine a range of difficult questions,
including under what conditions its opinions would be made public. Like some of the other
roles assumed by the court, this was not a function envisioned by Congress in 1978.
As the FISC/FISCR have been forced to wrestle with difficult constitutional and statutory
questions, non-specialized Article III courts increasingly have had to take account of their
jurisprudence. In part this also has to do with changed conditions regarding standing. In
39

Four days after the first articles appeared in The Guardian and Washington Post, for instance, on June 10, 2013
the ACLU and Yale Media Freedom Information Access Clinic (MFIAC) filed a motion to obtain all FISC
opinions evaluating the meaning, scope, and constitutionality of bulk collection. Four days later, Yahoo! moved
under FISC Rule 62(a) to request the Court to order publication of an opinion from 2008, which had been
appealed to FISCR and referenced in In re Directives, 551 F.3d 1004, GID.CA.00002. On June 19, Microsoft
requested permission to disclose the aggregate information related to FISC orders with which it had been served.
Google, Facebook, and LinkedIn soon filed parallel requests. On June 28, sixteen members of the U.S. House of
Representatives filed an amicus brief in support of the ACLU/MFIAC motion—a move followed on July 8 by the
First Amendment Coalition, the Center for Democracy and Technology, the Electronic Frontier Foundation, and
on July 15 by a formidable media conglomerate: the Reporters’ Committee, ABC News, the Associated Press,
Bloomberg News, Dow Jones, the Los Angeles Times, National Public Radio, Reuters, the New Yorker,
Newsweek, the Washington Post, and others. By mid-November 2013, further motions for judicial records had
been filed by the Center for National Security Studies and ProPublica. For further discussion, see discussion in
Part II.E, Standing, infra.
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Clapper v. Amnesty International, the Solicitor General represented to the Supreme Court that
the Justice Department would inform criminal defendants if FISA-derived information was
used against them.40 It was not until a New York Times article revealed in 2013 that the
government was not in the practice of doing so, however, that the policy changed.41 The
definition of “derived from” remains classified. Nevertheless, an increasing number of
defendants are being informed that evidence against them derives from FISA. Simultaneously,
dozens of Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) suits over the past decade have sought access
to FISC opinions and orders.42 A number have been successful in contributing to the material
in the public domain.43
There are now more than 180 FISA-related cases in regular Article III courts—approximately
twice the total number of FISC/FISCR cases that have been made publicly available by the
courts, Office of the Director National Intelligence (ODNI), or FOIA litigation.44 The
specialized Article III courts (FISC/FISCR) and the non-specialized, geographic Article III
courts (i.e., District Courts and Courts of Appeal) are increasingly in dialogue as the caselaw
evolves, making it all the more important to address the scope of FISC/FISCR jurisprudence.
This Article suggests that the bulk of the issues that come before the courts derive from four
key areas. Each can be explained by tensions inherent in the FISC/FISCR current role and the
structure developed by Congress in 1978. Understanding these areas can help to clarify
questions before the courts by placing them in their broader context and provide a framework
for how to think about any future legislative changes. The goal is to ensure a deeper theoretical
grasp of the role of the courts in foreign intelligence law.

See Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l, 568 U.S. 398, 421–22 (2013).
See Nina Totenberg, Government Takes a U-Turn on Warrantless Wiretaps, NPR (Oct. 23, 2013),
https://www.npr.org/2013/10/23/240163063/government-changes-policy-on-warrantless-wiretap-defendants
[https://perma.cc/ZBA2-THYX]; Eric Schmidt et al., Administration Says Mining Data Is Crucial to Fight
Terrorism, N.Y. TIMES (June 7, 2013), https://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/08/us/mining-of-data-is-called-crucialto-fight-terror.html?module=inline [https://perma.cc/TH3B-G3CY]; Adam Liptak, A Secret Surveillance
Program Proves Challengeable in Theory Only, N.Y. TIMES (July 15, 2013),
https://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/16/us/double-secret-surveillance.html [https://perma.cc/PLH6-JADQ];
Charlie Savage, Federal Prosecutors, in a Policy Shift, Cite Warrantless Wiretaps as Evidence, N.Y. TIMES (Oct.
26, 2013), https://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/27/us/federal-prosecutors-in-a-policy-shift-cite-warrantlesswiretaps-as-evidence.html [https://perma.cc/B9MB-HPQJ].
42 See, e.g., ACLU v. ODNI, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d, 2011 WL 5563520 (Nov. 15, 2011); New York Times
Co. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 872 F.Supp.2d 309 (S.D.N.Y. 2012); Elec. Frontier Found. v. Dep’t of Justice, 892
F.Supp.2d 95 (D.D.C. 2012); Elec. Frontier Found. v. Dep’t of Justice, U.S. Ct. of Appeals for D.C., 739 F.3d 1,
Jan. 3, 2014; cert. denied Elec. Frontier Found. v. Dep’t of Justice, 135 S.Ct. 356 (2014); Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr.
v. DOJ, No. 13cv1961, 2016 WL 447426 (D.D.C. Feb. 4, 2016).
43
See, e.g., ACLU v. ODNI, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d, 2011 WL 5563520 (Nov. 15, 2011); Elec. Frontier
Found. v. DOJ, No.: 4:11-cv-05221-YGR, 2014 WL 3945646 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 11, 2014).
44 Despite the increasing importance of the courts’ jurisprudence, FISC/FISCR opinions and orders have not
hitherto been easily accessible. Less than two dozen declassified and redacted opinions are available on the
court’s web site. Some opinions are only available through the Office of the Director of National Intelligence
(ODNI). Others are only available from individuals who have submitted Freedom of Information Act requests or
engaged in litigation with the Department of Justice to obtain the materials—and decided to place them online.
Neither Westlaw nor Lexis, moreover, carry most of the opinions, despite FISA issues regularly now appearing in
ordinary Article III courts. No site has all of the declassified and redacted court filings available. Accordingly,
Jeremy McCabe, Leah Prescott, and I have created a text-searchable database at Georgetown Law Library with
all of the formally released (and often redacted) FISC/FISCR opinions and orders, along with all of the publicly
available guidelines. Foreign Intelligence Law Collection, DIGITAL GEO.,
https://repository.library.georgetown.edu/handle/10822/1052698 [https://perma.cc/NQ4B-CQYN] (last updated
Mar. 17, 2021).
40
41
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The first area of tension arises from the courts’ statutory jurisdiction, Article III status, and the
specialized nature of the cases that they consider. Somewhat surprisingly, there is almost no
attention paid in the Federal Courts scholarship to the role of specialized Article III entities in
contrast to non-specialized, geographic courts—much less their distinction from the myriad
other types of federal courts in existence.45 Yet the associated questions are foundational and
particularly important for the FISC/FISCR. Separation of powers, issues related to the standing
of third parties and the public, the scope of the courts’ subject-matter jurisdiction, and the
relationship between specialized and non-specialized courts have all played a central role in
the courts’ jurisprudence. The cases also reveal efforts by the Executive to classify judicial
opinions that reveal Executive Branch malfeasance—raising further concern about efforts by
Article II to undermine the constitutional powers and responsibilities of an Article III entity.
The second cluster finds root in the tension between new technologies and old statutory
language—i.e., text drafted with very different technologies in mind. Here, the FISC has
repeatedly had to return to questions about what, precisely, constitutes “electronic
surveillance,” how to understand “electronic communications,” and what is included in the
definition of a “facility.” So, too, has it wrestled with the line between intercepts and searches
in the mobile digital world. Distinguishing between “content” versus “non-content” in relation
to PRTT, and how to handle technologies like the use of post-cut-through-dialed-digits
provide just a few examples. Further issues arise in relation to business records, bulk
collection, and Section 702 acquisition.
The third cluster centers on constitutional rights, wherein the tension between secrecy (as
statutorily required or as demanded by the Executive Branch), surveillance, and individual
rights comes to the fore. The courts have had to wrestle here with matters related to the First
Amendment right of access that derives from the right to petition the government, as well as,
to a lesser extent, associational rights. Equally important have been Fourth Amendment
concerns—particularly in relation to third party data and the reasonableness requirement. The
Fifth Amendment has appeared around the edges in the context of due process protections.
The fourth and final cluster centers on process and compliance, where tension marks the
frontier between public and private accountability. Innumerable instances of noncompliance,
coupled with blatant misrepresentations to the court, have put the FISC in the position of
having to conduct ongoing oversight of the intelligence community. Irregularities in regard to
special as well as standard minimization procedures (SMPs), targeting, and querying
procedures have repeatedly presented. The court has had to address inaccurate, materially
omitted, erroneous, and false statements. Some opinions further call attention to the problem
of overcollection and what could be termed the “data dilemma”: i.e., what to do with
information obtained outside statutory or judicial restrictions.
Having examined each of these areas, the Article concludes by underscoring some of the trends
that we are now seeing, as well as areas where we might expect to see more concentration in
the future, based on the structural pressures.
II. Cluster 1: The FISC/FISCR as Specialized, Article III Courts

45

For scholarship on the distinction between Article III specialized and geographic courts, as well as the full
panoply of federal courts, see Laura K. Donohue and Jeremy J. McCabe, Federal Courts: Art. III(1), Art. I(8),
Art. IV(3), Art. II(2)/I(8) Hybrid, and Art. II(1) Adjudication (working paper),
https://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub/2373/.
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One of the most important tensions to which the FISC/FISCR has had to return repeatedly is
how to understand its status as a specialized Article III court. To some extent the questions
that mark this area reflect a dearth in the scholarship: surprisingly little has been written on
the range of federal courts and their distinguishing characteristics. Nevertheless, what is clear
from statutory language, legislative history, and jurisprudence of both specialized and nonspecialized, geographic Article III courts, is that the FISC and FISCR find their constitutional
nexus in Article III(1) and thus carry with them the inherent powers of such entities. The FISC,
accordingly, has exercised some ancillary powers even as it has wrestled with the scope of its
jurisdiction.
A. Constitutional Grounding
Article III(1) non-specialized courts are those entities that enter the mind when envisioning
federal courts: i.e., the U.S. Supreme Court, the Courts of Appeal, and the District Courts.
With the exception of the Supreme Court, each is brought into being by Congress. They are
provided with broad subject-matter jurisdiction and designated as the courts of record for
distinct geographic regions.46
Less well-known are the specialized Article III(1) courts. Over the course of U.S. history,
there have been at least a dozen such entities, five of which are still in existence.47
Distinguishing between the two categories by referring to the narrower subject matter of
specialized tribunals, though, is somewhat of a misnomer: all federal Article III(1) courts are
courts of limited jurisdiction.48 As the Supreme Court explained in 1812, “[T]he power which
congress possess to create Courts of inferior jurisdiction, necessarily implies the power to limit
the jurisdiction of those Courts to particular objects.”49 The legislature merely grants
geographic Article III(1) courts the authority to hear more types of cases.
Whether a court falls within Article III of the Constitution turns in part on whether it satisfies
structural requirements: i.e., unity, supremacy, and inferiority within the Judicial Branch.
The composition and operation of the court also must comply with the constitutional
requirements of tenure of office during good behavior and undiminished compensation, as
well as the case-or-controversy stipulations.
Courts that do not meet these requirements are considered alternately (and misleadingly)50
“non-constitutional,” “legislative,” or “Article I” courts—i.e., tribunals “created by Congress
46

See Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, §§ 9, 11, 1 Stat. 73, 76–77, 78–79 (district and defunct circuit courts);
Judiciary Act of 1891, ch. 517, §§ 2, 6, 26 Stat. 826, 826–27, 828 (circuit courts of appeals).
47 Past Article III specialized courts include: the Customs Court (replaced by U.S. Court of International Trade);
Court of Customs and Patent Appeals; Emergency Court of Appeals (WWII challenges to Price Administration
regulations); Temporary Emergency Court of Appeals; Commerce Court; Special Railroad Court; Court of
Claims; and Courts of the District of Columbia (which are now considered Article I entities). The current
specialized courts include the FISC and FISCR, Alien Terrorist Removal Court, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit, and the U.S. Court of International Trade. For more discussion of each of these entities, and their
designation, see Donohue & McCabe, supra note 45.
48 See Patchak v. Zinke, 138 S. Ct. 897, 906–07 (2018); Gunn v. Minton, 568 U.S. 251, 256–58 (2013); Bender
v. Williamsport Area Sch. Dist., 475 U.S. 534, 541 (1986); Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365,
374 (1978); Owen Equip. & Kline v. Burke Constr. Co., 260 U.S. 226, 234 (1922); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S.
(1 Cranch) 137, 173-80 (1803); Turner v. Bank of N. Am., 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 8, 10 (1799).
49 United States v Hudson, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32, 33 (1812).
50 All federal courts derive from a constitutional nexus. Some non-Article III entities, moreover, are created by
legislation, but others are not. Further, while some tribunals derive from provisions in Article I, others stem from
Article IV or Article II. For more detailed discussion of the myriad federal courts introduced over the course of
U.S. history, see Donohue & McCabe, supra note 45.
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in the exertion of other powers.”51 They “are not . . . [c]ourts, in which the judicial power
conferred by the Constitution on the general government, can be deposited.”52 Instead, they
arise out of other constitutional provisions, such as Congress’s tax powers,53 commerce,
bankruptcy, and citizenship authorities,54 copyrights and patents,55 control of the military,56
governance over Washington, D.C.,57 or regulation of the territories.58 Pari passu, consular
courts, and certain adjudicatory bodies find their locus in the Executive Branch and do not
constitute the Judicial Branch of government.59
The distinction matters: these other courts do not exercise the judicial power of the United
States. Article III(1) constitutional courts, like the FISC and FISCR, do.60 They have the
authority to enter final, binding judgments relating to constitutional law and common law. As
the Supreme Court put it in 1888, “The whole work done by the judges constitutes the
authentic exposition and interpretation of the law.”61 It is thus within the purview of Article
III courts to dispose of cases, applying law to the facts, before rendering a final, binding
judgment.
As a matter of separation of powers, once this process is put into motion, Congress and the
Executive cannot interfere.62 Nor can they insert themselves into the process after the fact—a
principle famously recognized in Hayburn’s Case.63 If the political branches could interfere
(for instance, by overturning the court’s final judgment or stripping the court of authority over
their own opinions), it would render the independence of the judiciary of no consequence. It
would not matter what the court said or did. All the courts have is their judgment as to matters
of law.
B. FISC/FISCR Article III Status
Every Article III court—specialized and non-specialized—that has considered the question of
whether the FISC and FISCR are Article III courts has answered in the affirmative.64 As FISC
Judge John Bates explained in 2007, “Notwithstanding the esoteric nature of its caseload, the
FISC is an inferior federal court established by Congress under Article III.” 65 Efforts to
51

Ex parte Bakelite Corp., 279 U.S. 438, 449 (1929) (emphasis added).
Am. Ins. Co. v. 365 Bales of Cotton (Canter), 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511, 546 (1828) (emphasis added).
53 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
54 Id. art. I, § 8, cls. 3, 4.
55 Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
56 Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 14, 16.
57 Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 17.
58 Id. art. IV.
59 See generally Donohue & McCabe, supra note 45.
60 See Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462, 494–95 (2011).
61
Banks v. Manchester, 128 U.S. 244, 253 (1888).
62 See United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 145-48 (1871).
63 Hayburn’s Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409, 410 n.† (1892); see also Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211,
217–18 (1995).
64 See, e.g., United States v. Cavanagh, 807 F.2d 787, 791 (9th Cir. 1987); United States v. Megahey, 553 F.
Supp. 1180, 1197 (E.D.N.Y. 1982), aff’d, 727 F.2d 1444 (2d Cir. 1983); United States v. Falvey, 540 F. Supp.
1306, 1313 n.16 (E.D.N.Y. 1982); In re Kevork, 634 F. Supp. 1002, 1014 (C.D. Cal. 1985) (district court judges
retain "Article III status" when acting as members of the FISC), aff d, 788 F.2d 566 (9th Cir. 1986); Opinion and
Order, In re Ords. of this Ct. Interpreting Section 215 of the Patriot Act, No. Misc. 13-02, GID.C.00085, at 4
(FISA Ct. Sept. 13, 2013) (Saylor IV, J.) (“The FISC is an Article III Court.”); In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717,
731, GID.CA.00001, at 731 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2002) (per curiam) (applying to the FISC “the constitutional bounds
that restrict an Article III court.”).
65 In re Motion for Release of Ct. Recs., 526 F. Supp. 2d 484, 486, GID.C.00021, at 3 (FISA Ct. 2007) (Bates,
J.).
52

11

question their status on the grounds of the judges’ seven-year tenure have been roundly
defeated.66 As a Ninth Circuit District Court explained in 1985, “The FISA court is wholly
composed of United States District Court judges, who have been appointed for life by the
President, with the advice and consent of the Senate, and whose salaries cannot be reduced.”67
The constitutional requirement of tenure of office is thus satisfied, as is the protection against
diminished compensation.
The statutorily-required in camera, ex parte procedures do not remove the FISC/FISCR from
the ambit of Article III. The legislative design in 1978 laid out a process not dissimilar from
ordinary warrant procedures—an approach that made sense in light of the courts’ initially
limited role in granting or denying applications for surveillance. Giving such powers to the
court did not amount to an unconstitutional delegation of authority. As the FISCR reflected in
2002, “In light of Morrison v. Olson and Mistretta v. United States, we do not think there is
much left to an argument made by an opponent of FISA in 1978 that the statutory
responsibilities of the FISA court are inconsistent with Article III case and controversy
responsibilities of federal judges because of the secret, non-adversary process.”68
Nor does limited subject matter jurisdiction impact the courts’ status. In 1982, the FISC
explained, “[a]s an inferior court established by Congress pursuant to Article III of the
Constitution,” the court is limited to “only such jurisdiction as the FISA confers upon it and
such ancillary authority as may fairly be implied from the powers expressly granted to it.”69
All federal courts, in this sense, are courts of limited jurisdiction. More recently, in 2018, the
court stated, “the FISC’s authority and inherent secrecy is cabined by—and consistent with —
Article III of the Constitution.”70 The FISC therefore acts with the understanding that its
“jurisdiction is governed by Article III, section 2, of the Constitution.”71
C. Inherent Powers
Owing to their constitutional status within the third branch of government, the FISC and
FISCR carry with them the same inherent powers of all Article III courts.72 FISA
acknowledges, “Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to reduce or contravene the inherent
authority of a court established under this section to determine or enforce compliance with an
order or a rule of such court or with a procedure approved by such court.”73 FISC Presiding
Judge John Bates later attributed the source of the court’s inherent authorities to its Article III
status.74
Inherent powers incorporate a range of powers central to the courts’s role in administering
justice, foremost amongst which is the importance of being able to ensure fairness in the course
Cavanagh, 807 F.2d at 791 (“[Appellant] . . . appears to suggest that the FISA court is not properly constituted
under [A]rticle III because the statute does not provide for life tenure on the FISA court. This argument has been
raised in a number of cases and has been rejected by the courts. We reject it as well.”) (citations omitted).
67 Kevork, 634 F. Supp. at 1014.
68 In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d at 732 n.19, GID.CA.00001, at 732 n.19 (citation omitted).
69 In re Application of the United States for an Ord. Authorizing the Physical Search of Nonresidential Premises
& Pers. Prop., GID.C.00001 (FISA Ct. June 11, 1981) (Hart, J.), reprinted in S. REP. NO. 97-280 at 16 (1981).
70 In re Certification of Questions of L. to the Foreign Intel. Surveillance Ct. of Rev., GID.CA.00006, at 8 (FISA
Ct. Rev. Mar. 16, 2018).
71 Id.
72 For more detailed discussion of Article III courts’ inherent powers, see Donohue & McCabe, supra note 45.
73 50 U.S.C.A. § 1803(h) (West).
74 In re Motion for Release of Ct. Recs., 526 F. Supp. 2d 484, 486, GID.C.00021, at 3 (FISA Ct. 2007) (Bates,
J.).
66
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of adjudication. This includes, inter alia, the exercise of equitable remedies, as established by
Article III(2), which extends the judicial power “to all Cases, in Law and Equity.” Article III
entities, accordingly, can appoint auditors, special masters, and commissioners to undertake
investigations.75 Like its sistren, the foreign intelligence courts can require the production of
statements and parties to attend hearings.76 To ensure matters of law are addressed, they can
require additional legal memoranda and briefing,77 appoint counsel to serve standby,78 and
designate amici curiae.79 This the court has done on a number of occasions—including prior
to the USA FREEDOM Act, which explicitly allowed for the appointment of amici. In 2013,
Judge Mary A. McLaughlin, relying on non-specialized Article III caselaw, determined that
the FISC had the inherent power to allow amicus curiae to brief the court.80 Because of their
constitutional status, the FISC and FISCR also retain “all the inherent powers that any court
has when considering a warrant. There is no delegation of judicial power to the Executive
Branch.”81
In addition to ensuring fairness and justice, Article III courts have broad authority to facilitate
the efficient use of resources, which translates into an ability to manage their own affairs.82
Thus, while dockets themselves may include mandatory elements, how that docket is handled
falls within the courts’ purview.83 This includes, amongst other instruments, setting the order
in which issues will be addressed,84 as well as consolidating cases.85
The FISC has exercised these powers as well as other ancillary authorities that go to efficiency,
such as comity and the first-to-file rule—both of which are considered classic inherent powers.
In 2013, for example, Judge Dennis Saylor found standing on First Amendment grounds for
an American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) motion for the release of Section 215-related
opinions, but then stayed the case on the grounds that a substantially similar one was moving
through the Southern District of New York pursuant to FOIA.86 The court wrote, “As a matter
of comity, and in order to conserve judicial resources and avoid inconsistent judgments,
federal courts do not engage in parallel adjudications involving the same parties and issues.”87
Similarly, in 2015, FISC Judge Michael Mosman denied Ken Cuccinelli and FreedomWorks
75

See In re Peterson, 253 U.S. 300, 304-07, 312-14 (1920); Ruiz v. Estelle, 679 F.2d 1115, 1161 (5th Cir. 1982),
amended in part and vacated in part on other grounds, 688 F.2d 266 (5th Cir. 1982); Schwimmer v. United
States, 232 F.2d 855, 865 (8th Cir. 1956); Heckers v. Fowler, 69 U.S. (2 Wall.) 123, 127–29 (1864).
76 See Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657, 668–69 (1957); Brockton Sav. Bank v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell &
Co., 771 F.2d 5, 11–12 (1st Cir. 1985).
77 Alameda v. Sec’y of Health, Educ. & Welfare, 622 F.2d 1044, 1047 (1st Cir. 1980).
78 United States v. Bertoli, 994 F.2d 1002, 1018 (3d Cir. 1993).
79 In re Utils. Power & Light Corp., 90 F.2d 798, 800 (7th Cir. 1937).
80 The Court applies previous Article III case precedent to the FISC to conclude it has the inherent authority to
allow “amicus curiae briefs within the context of the statutory provisions that set out the ex parte and classified
nature of proceedings under the . . . . Section 215.” Order and Memorandum Opinion, In re Application of the
FBI for an Ord. Requiring Prod. of Tangible Things, No. BR 13-158, GID.C.00090, at 5 (FISA Ct. Dec. 18,
2013) (McLaughlin, J.).
81 In re Kevork, 634 F. Supp. 1002, 1014 (C.D. Cal. 1985).
82 Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Haegar, 137 S. Ct. 1178, 1186 (2017) (quoting Link v. Wabash R.R., 370 U.S.
626, 630-31 (1962)); In re Atl. Pipe Corp., 304 F.3d 135, 143 (1st Cir. 2002); Arthur Pierson & Co., v. Provimi
Veal Corp., 887 F.2d 837, 839 (7th Cir. 1989).
83 See Daniel J. Meador, Inherent Judicial Authority in the Conduct of Civil Litigation, 73 TEX. L. REV. 1805,
1805 (1995)).
84 Marinechance Shipping, Ltd. v. Sebastian, 143 F.3d 216, 218 (5th Cir. 1998).
85 See MacAlister v. Guterma, 263 F.2d 65, 68 (2d Cir. 1958).
86 Opinion and Order, In re Ords. of this Ct. Interpreting Section 215 of the Patriot Act, No. Misc. 13-02,
GID.C.00085, at 1–2 (FISA Ct. Sept. 13, 2013) (Saylor IV, J.) (referencing Am. C.L. Union v. FBI, 2015 WL
1566775, No. 11cv7562 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2015)).
87 Id. at 13.
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a motion to intervene in a suit under the first-to-file rule. The parties and issues involved, as
well as the relief sought, “extensively overlap[ped] with a suit previously commenced in the
United States District Court for the District of Columbia.”88 The judge noted the risk of
“duplicative effort and risk of inconsistent outcomes.”89 The movants, as plaintiffs in the other
suit suing brought against largely the same individuals, presented the same standing questions
present in the non-specialized, Article III entity.
The final category of inherent powers within the purview of Article III stems from the courts’s
ability to protect their own integrity, independence and reputation. These powers are wellrecognized in the non-specialized, geographic courts, where they assume a range of powers to
prevent fraud on the court, such as launching their own investigations,90 or setting aside
decisions if they are later determined to be based on fraudulent representations.91 As addressed
in Part V below, the FISC has had to implement a number of steps in this category to respond
to government misrepresentation. Like all Article III courts, the FISC can sanction
contumacious behavior and impose penalties on individuals who act in bad faith.92 It has had
occasion to do so, such as its March 2020 opinion forbidding not just Kevin Clinesmith, the
attorney who made a deliberate, material misrepresentation to the court from appearing before
it, but also any attorney under disciplinary or criminal investigation for their work before the
FISC.93
D. Control of Judicial Records
Tension between the courts’ Article III status and the specialized nature of their proceedings
forcefully presents in regard to who controls the courts’ records. The issue stems from the
subject matter before the court. The classification regime, which is designed to protect
sensitive national security information, exists by executive fiat and is thus part and parcel of
the Executive Branch.94 So, what happens when the third branch of government uses classified
information as a basis for their work product? Although the government has become
increasingly strident in its arguments, the FISC, for the most part, has guarded its
constitutional authority while taking steps to protect against the unwitting release of harmful
information.
1. Non-specialized Courts

88

Opinion and Order, In re Application of the FBI for an Ord. Requiring the Prod. of Tangible Things, No. BR
15-75, GID.C.00117, at 4 (FISA Ct. June 29, 2015) (Mosman, J.).
89 Id. at 6.
90 Universal Oil Prod. Co. v. Root Refin. Co., 328 U.S. 575, 580 (1946).
91 As the Supreme court explained, the “historic power of equity to set aside fraudulently begotten judgments” is
central to judicial integrity because “tampering with the administration of justice in [this] manner . . . involves far
more than an injury to a single litigant. It is a wrong against the institutions set up to protect and safeguard the
public.” Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Harford-Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238, 245, 246 (1946); see also Universal Oil
Prods. Co, 328 U.S. at 580 (citing Hazel-Atlas, 322 U.S. 238); Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 44
(1991) (quoting Hazel-Atlas, 322 U.S. at 245, 246).
92 See Link v. Wabash R.R., 370 U.S. 626, 630–31 (1962); Chambers, 501 U.S. at 44 (citing Link, 370 U.S. at
630–31); Ex parte Burr, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 529, 531 (1824); Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 765–
66 (1980); Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Haegar, 137 S. Ct. 1178, 1183–84 (2017) (holding that federal courts
have inherent authority to sanction bad-faith conduct); Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc’y, 421 U.S.
240, 258–59 (1975) (quoting F.D. Rich Co. v. United States ex rel. Indus. Lumber Co., 417 U.S. 116, 129
(1974)).
93 Corrected Opinion and Order, In re Accuracy Concerns Regarding FBI Matters Submitted to the FISC, No.
Misc. 19-02, GID.C.00272, at 18 (FISA Ct. Mar. 5, 2020) (Boasberg, J.).
94 See Exec. Order No. 13,526, 69 Fed. Reg. 53,599 (Aug. 27, 2004).
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The ability to decide a case lies at the heart of Article III authority: as the Supreme Court
observed in 1825, “The judicial department is invested with jurisdiction in certain specified
cases, in all of which it has the power to render judgment.”95 Neither the Executive Branch nor
Congress can dictate to the courts how to decide cases or require a court to issue—or stop the
court from issuing—a decision.
Article III(1) courts, accordingly, recognize their inherent authority “to protect their
proceedings and judgments in the course of discharging their traditional responsibilities.”96
They have the power “to command respect for the court’s orders, judgments, procedures, and
authority”97 Article III courts thus have supervisory power over their own records and files.98
They can issue opinions, and they can seal, unseal, revoke, or rescind orders. 99 Courts
routinely exercise jurisdiction over third party requests for records, as well as motions for
common law or First Amendment right of access.100 This ranges from applications for
warrants to judicial opinions.101 The tipping point is whether the records are “judicial
documents,” understood as materials that go to “the exercise of Article III judicial power.”102
The moment at which they become so, the public has a presumptive right of access through
the court in which they were filed.103
Article III courts continue to exercise jurisdiction over their records after the conclusion of
the matter before the court.104 They have “the inherent power to correct errors, remedy
omissions, and correct clerical errors in its records.”105 They can “modify or lift protective
orders that [have been] entered.”106 They can unseal records after the fact.107 And they can reopen a case.108 Their jurisdiction “is not exhausted by the rendition of its judgment, but
95

Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 22 (1825); see also Doe v. Apfel, No. 98-CV-182, 1999 WL
182669, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 22, 1999) (“Courts have recognized that a judicial opinion deciding a case lies at
the heart of the exercise of Article III powers.”)
96 Degen v. United States, 517 U.S. 820, 823 (1996).
97 In re Stone, 986 F.2d 898, 902 (1996).
98 Nixon v. Warner Commc’ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 598 (1978). See also Gambale v. Deutsche Bank AG, 377
F.3d 133, 140–41 (2d Cir. 2004); Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Fed. Trade Comm'n, 710 F.2d 1165,
1177 (6th Cir. 1983). In Nixon, SCOTUS held that neither the common law right of access nor the First
Amendment, nor the Sixth Amendment guarantee of a public trial compelled the release of tapes from the
custody of the District Court. Nixon, 435 U.S. at 609-611.
99 See, e.g., Fernandez v. United States, 81 S. Ct. 642, 644 (1961).
100 See, e.g., Douglas Oil v. Petrol Stops Nw., 441 U.S. 211 (1979); United States v. Bus. of Custer Battlefield
Museum & Store, 658 F.3d 1188, 1192–96 (9th Cir. 2011); Chi. Trib. Co. v. Bridgestone/Firestone Inc., 263 F.3d
1304, 1310–13 (11th Cir. 2001); In re Nat’l Sec. Archive, No. 08 Civ. 6599, 2008 WL 8985358, at *1 (S.D.N.Y.
Aug. 26, 2008); In re Am. Hist. Ass’n, 49 F. Supp. 2d 274, 295 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
101 See, e.g., Doe v. Pub. Citizen, 749 F.3d 246, 265–68 (4th Cir. 2014); Nixon, 435 U.S. at 597; United States v.
Kravetz, 706 F.3d 47, 56-59 (1st Cir. 2013); Lugosch v. Pyramid Co. of Onondaga, 435 F.3d 110, 119–24, 126
(2d Cir. 2006); In re Providence J. Co., 293 F.3d 1, 9–13 (1st Cir. 2002); United States v. Corbitt, 879 F.2d 224,
228 (7th Cir. 1989); In re Wash. Post Co., 807 F.2d 383, 390 (4th Cir. 1986); United States v. Smith, 776 F.2d 1104,
1107–13 (3d Cir. 1985); Belo Broad. Corp. v. Clark, 654 F.2d 423, 429–30 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v. Myers
(In re Nat’l Broad. Co.), 635 F.2d 945, 947–48 (2d Cir. 1980).
102 United States v. Amodeo (Amodeo II), 71 F.3d 1044, 1047–48 (2d Cir. 1995).
103 See, e.g., Lugosch, 435 F.3d at 119; Amodeo II, 71 F.3d at 1048-52; Stern v. Cosby, 529 F.Supp.2d 417, 420
(S.D.N.Y. 2007).
104 See, e.g., Doe v. United States, 853 F.3d 792, 798 (5th Cir. 2017) (A court “has the power to manage its
records, even though the proceeding that generated those records has concluded.”); Qureshi v. United States,
600 F.3d 523, 525 (5th Cir. 2010) (“That the court loses jurisdiction over the litigation does not, however,
deprive the district court of its inherent supervisory powers.” (citing Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S.
384, 395 (1990)).
105 20 AM. JUR. 2D Courts § 25, Westlaw (database updated Feb. 2021) (citations omitted).
106 In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 821 F.2d 139, 145 (2d Cir. 1987).
107 See Doe, 749 F.3d at 252-53; Oregonion Pub. Co. v. U.S. Dist. Ct., 920 F.2d 1462, 1465–68 (9th Cir. 1990).
108 United States v. Alcantara, 396 F.3d 189, 201–02 (2d Cir. 2005).
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continues.”109 Courts can punish those who might “disregard . . . the product of their
functioning, their judgments.”110
Should courts not be able to control their own determinations, it would undermine their
constitutional role. “Courts of record can speak only by or through their records, and what
does not so appear does not exist in law.”111 If the other branches could divest the courts of
ownership over their records, they could alter the principles of law according to their own
interests. They could hide malfeasance, with deep implications for democratic representation
and accountability. And they could undermine the judicial branch. The core of judicial power
is the ability to render decisions.
Like the powers addressed in the prior section, control of judicial records is an inherent power
of Article III entities: in none of the cases in which courts have entertained requests for their
records has Congress made a statutory grant of power over the records in question. Some
courts go so far as to recognize it even when it conflicts with the statutorily-derived rules.112
In one case, historians filed a motion requesting that a court unseal grand jury transcripts
from an Espionage Act case seventy years prior.113 The district court regarded the request as
well within its power.114 On appeal, the court noted that “Every federal court to consider the
issue” has determined that “a district court’s limited inherent power to supervise a grand jury
includes the power to unseal grand-jury materials when appropriate.”115 The plaintiff “chose
the Northern District of Illinois because it was the court that originally had supervisory
jurisdiction over the grand jury in question.”116 He argued that this same court has continuing
common-law authority over matters pertaining to that grand jury.117 It did not matter that that
the individual himself had no connection to the underlying action.118 “[R]epresentatives of
the press and general public must be given an opportunity to be heard on the question of . . .
access to documents.”119 “To hold otherwise would raise First Amendment concerns.”120 The
line is the point at which the documents become part of the judicial record. Accordingly, the
case law includes materials deep in litigation, all the way up to final judgment.121
2. The Foreign Intelligence Courts
The first time this issue came to the FISC appears to have been in 2007, when Judge Bates,
following Warner Communications, held that the FISC has supervisory jurisdiction over its
own documents. He rejected the government’s argument that the court lacked jurisdiction
over its own opinions, writing, it would be “quite odd if the FISC did not have jurisdiction
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Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 23 (1825).
Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A., 481 U.S. 787, 821 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring)
(emphasis omitted).
111
20 AM. JUR. 2D Courts § 22, Westlaw (database updated Feb. 2021) (citations omitted) (“The court record is
the permanent account of that court’s proceedings in particular cases, as well as the court’s opinion or decision.”)
112 See, e.g., In re Craig, 131 F.3d 99, 103 (2d Cir. 1997).
113 Carlson v. United States, 837 F.3d 753, 756-61 (7th Cir. 2016).
114 Id.
115 Id. at 755-56.
116 Id. at 757.
117 Id.
118 Id. at 759.
119 Id. (quoting Jessup v. Luther, 227 F.3d 993, 997 (7th Cir. 2000)).
120 Id.
121 See, e.g., United States v. Sealed Search Warrants, 868 F.3d 385, 390–96 (5th Cir. 2017) (holding that the
district court had jurisdiction to determine whether a common law qualified right of access extended to preindictment search materials).
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in the first instance to adjudicate a claim of right to the court’s very own records and files.”122
In 2013, Judge Reggie Walton cited back to Bates’s opinion to determine that the FISC
continues to exercise jurisdiction over records following final determination of the matter
before it, as reflected in the FISC Rules of Procedure.123
FISC Rule 62 acknowledges the court’s control of its records, allowing for the court to
determine when to make its opinions public. In 2014, “in the exercise of its discretion,”124
the FISC determined that it was “appropriate to take steps toward publication of any Section
215 Opinions” that were not subject to parallel FOIA litigation, without reaching the merits
of an asserted right of public access under the First Amendment.125 The court ordered the
government to identify which opinions were and were not subject to the FOIA litigation and
to “propose a timetable to complete a declassification review and submit to the Court its
proposed redactions, if any.”126 The government returned with just one opinion, stating that
it should be withheld in full.127 The court did not accept the government’s position.128
Ordered to provide further documentation, the government determined “upon review and as
a discretionary matter . . . that it does not object if this Court determines, pursuant to Rule
62(a), that those portions of the Opinion that are not classified and release of which would
not jeopardize” an ongoing investigation be published.129 Again, the court pushed back,
leading to broader publication.130
Similarly, in February 2020, the FISC held that it had subject matter jurisdiction over a Motion
for the Release of Court Records, and ancillary jurisdiction over the claim. The court
recognized jurisdiction following the second prong of Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of
Am., which allows jurisdiction outside of a statutory grant “to enable a court to function
successfully, that is, to manage its proceedings, vindicate its authority, and effectuate its

122

Memorandum Opinion, In re Motion for Release of Ct. Recs., 526 F. Supp. 2d 484, GID.C.00021, at 4 (FISA
Ct. 2007) (Bates, J.). This opinion was also cited favorably in Opinion and Order, In re Motion for Consent to
Disclosure of Ct. Recs. or, in the Alternative, A Determination of the Effect of the Ct’s Rules on Statutory Access
Rights, No. 13-01, GID.C.00082, at 2, (FISA Ct. June 12, 2013) (Walton, J).
123 In re Motion, GID.C.00082, at 2–3. In that case, the Government had been trying to play two ends off against
the middle: the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) had brought a FOIA request in the District of Columbia for
a FISC record. The Justice Department argued to the District Court that the FISC, by operation of Rule 62, had
authority and control over copies of the opinion in the Government’s possession. The EFF moved to stay and
brought a parallel motion before the FISC. Before the specialized court, the Government contended that the FISC
did not have jurisdiction because the copies of the opinion were in the Government’s possession and EFF was
thus asserting a statutory, and not a constitutional, right of access against the Executive Branch. The FISC
rejected the Government’s argument that it therefore lacked jurisdiction. Id.
124 See Opinion and Order Directing Declassification of Redacted Opinion, In re Ords. of this Ct. Interpreting
Section 215 of the Patriot Act, No. Misc. 13-02, GID.C.00104, at 3 (FISA Ct. Aug. 7, 2014) (Saylor IV, J.).
125 See In re Ords. of this Ct. Interpreting Sec. 215 of the Patriot Act, No. Misc. 13-02 GID.C.00085, at 17, 2013
WL 5460064, at *8 (FISA Ct. Sept. 13, 2013) (Saylor IV, J.).
126 Id. at 18, 2013 WL 546064, at *8.
127 In re Ords. of this Ct., GID.C.00104 at 4 (citing Second Submission of the United States in Response to the
Court's Oct. 8, 2013 Order at 2, In re Ords. of this Ct. Interpreting Sec. 215 of the Patriot Act, No. Misc. 13-02
(FISA Ct. Nov. 18, 2013), https://repository.library.georgetown.edu/handle/10822/1055928
[https://perma.cc/Q3TV-W9TR].
128 Two days later, the court responded, ordering the Government to submit a detailed explanation of why the
opinion could not be made public, even in redacted form, and to provide an unclassified explanation, under FISC
Rule 7(j) to the two parties in the suit. Order, In re Ords. of this Ct. Interpreting Sec. 215 of the Patriot Act, No.
Misc. 13-02, GID.C.00181, at 2 (FISA Ct. Nov. 20, 2013) (Saylor IV, J.).
129 In re Ords. of this Ct., GID.C.00104, at 5.
130 The court reviewed the First Redaction proposal and questioned its scope. Id. at 5–6. On February 6, 2014, the
Government submitted a second redaction proposal, which the court accepted and ordered to be published. Id. at
6–7.
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decrees.”131 In drafting opinions, an action contemplated by Congress, the FISC has the
inherent power of any Article III court.132 Thus, the FISCR, even as it decided not to exercise
jurisdiction over a First Amendment right of access claim, simultaneously stated that it was
declining to act on its ancillary authority.133
Despite the government’s protestations, separation of powers means that the executive cannot
bind the court and classify judicial opinions. No more so could it bind Congress—a fact
recognized by rules in the Senate and House of Representatives that retain for the legislature
the right to declassify material, even over Presidential objection.134
3. Mischaracterization of Dep’t of the Navy v. Eagan
The decisions and underlying briefs that have been made public over the past five years
demonstrate that the government has become increasingly strident—and inaccurate—in
arguments put forward to support its claim that it has control over FISC opinions as an
extension of its classification authority. In doing so, it frequently mischaracterizes Dep’t of
the Navy v. Egan as standing for the proposition that the authority to make national security
judgments related to classified material lies solely with the Executive Branch.135 The
Executive also uses Egan to buttress its claim that the Judiciary, unlike the Executive Branch,
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Opinion, In re Ops. & Ords. of this Ct. Addressing Bulk Collection of Data Under the Foreign Intel.
Surveillance Act, No. Misc. 13-08, GID.C.00267, at 11, 5 (FISA Ct. Feb. 11, 2020) (Collyer, J.) (quoting
Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 380 (1994)).
132 See 50 U.S.C.A. § 1803(a)(1), (b) (West).
133 In re Ops. & Ords. by the FISC Addressing Bulk Collection of Data Under the Foreign Intel. Surveillance Act,
957 F.3d 1344, 1355–57, GID.CA.00013, at 22-23 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2020) (per curiam).
134 See S. Res. 400, 94th Cong. § 8(a), (b)(1)–(5) (1976) (as amended through S. Res. 470, 113th Cong. (2014)),
reprinted in S. PRT. NO. 116-4 (2019); Rules of H.R., 116th Cong., Rule X(g)(1) (2019). The Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence (“SSCI”) controls information in its own records. S. Res. 400 § 10. Members may
declassify witness names and make classified material available to Senators and to the public. SSCI R.P., 116th
Cong., Rules 8.10, 9.5, 9.7; S. Res. 400, § 8(a). The House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
(“HPSCI”) safeguards sensitive national security information. HPSCI R.P., 116th Cong., Rules 12(a)–(b), 14
(2019). Once the Executive Branch provides classified information, it becomes committee material. Id. at Rule 13
(labelling it “executive session material”). HPSCI imposes an oath on Committee members and determines which
members of the House gain access to the material. Id. at Rule 14(d), (f), (g), (i). It can release classified
information to the entire House or to the public. Id. at Rule 14(l); House Rule X(11)(g). The committee takes into
account national defense and “[s]uch other concerns, constitutional or otherwise, as may affect the public interest
of the United States.” HPSCI R.P., Rule 14(f)(2)(A), (D).
135 Dep’t. of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518 (1988). For examples of the government making this claim before
the FISC, see United States’ Reply Brief at 6, In re Certification of Questions of L. to the Foreign Intel.
Surveillance Ct. of Rev., No. 18-01 (FISA Ct. Rev. Mar. 5, 2018),
https://repository.library.georgetown.edu/handle/10822/1056123 [https://perma.cc/RES3-ET5A]; Opening Brief
for the United States at 21–22, In re Certification of Questions of L. to the Foreign Intel. Surveillance Ct. of Rev.,
No. 18-01 (FISA Ct. Rev. Feb. 23, 2018) [hereinafter U.S. Opening Br.],
https://repository.library.georgetown.edu/handle/10822/1056118 [https://perma.cc/X8EM-QUSY]; United States'
Opposition to the Motion of the ACLU for the Release of Court Records at 11, In re Ops. and Ords. of this Ct.
Containing Novel or Significant Interpretations of Law, No. Misc. 16-01 (FISA Ct. June 8, 2017) [hereinafter
U.S. Opp. to Mot. of ACLU in No. Misc. 16-01],
https://repository.library.georgetown.edu/handle/10822/1056116 [https://perma.cc/Y9VH-J622]; United States’
Response to Movant’s En Banc Opening Brief at 6, In re Ops.& Ords. of This Ct. Addressing Bulk Collection of
Data Under the Foreign Intel. Surveillance Act, No. Misc. 13-08 (May 1, 2017),
https://repository.library.georgetown.edu/handle/10822/1056064 [https://perma.cc/GZG4-2SJ8]; United States’
Legal Brief to the En Banc Court in Response to the Court’s Order of March 22, 2017 at 11 n.4, In re Ops. &
Ords. of this Ct. Addressing Bulk Collection of Data Under the Foreign Intel. Surveillance Act, No. Misc. 13-08
(FISA Ct. No. Apr. 17, 2017), https://repository.library.georgetown.edu/handle/10822/1056062
[https://perma.cc/3489-4WMV].
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is ill-suited to make decisions bearing on national security.136 A parallel trend is appearing in
the government’s submissions to other Article III courts.137
These claims do not square with the facts and holding of the case itself, which focused on a
two-track system for an agency to take adverse action against government employees.138
Under the relevant statute, employees had a right to a hearing through appeal to the Merit
Systems Protection Board—a non-Article III tribunal.139 The court held that the statute did
not give the board control over security clearance determinations.140 That decision had to be
made by the appropriate agency inside the executive branch with the necessary expertise.141
To the extent that the court looked to the Commander-in-Chief powers, it was as to whether
the Executive had the authority to classify information in the first place, as well as to give, or
deny, access to that information to individuals hired by the Executive. The court explained:
“no one has a ‘right’ to a security clearance.”142
Despite the government’s effort to credit this case with standing for the broader proposition
that the executive has untrammeled authority to classify material—including judicial
opinions—the case says nothing of the sort.143 As the court noted at the beginning of its
See, e.g., U.S. Opening Br., supra note 135, at 21 (citing and quoting Egan, 484 U.S. at 529, for “holding that
predictive judgments related to national security risks ‘must be made by those with necessary expertise in
protecting classified information.’”); U.S. Opp. to Mot. of ACLU in No. Misc. 16-01, supra note 135, at 13
(raising concern that the FISC might err in making the determination as “judges with expertise in national
security matters cannot equal [the expertise] of the Executive Branch” (quotation omitted) (citing Egan, 484 U.S.
at 529)).
137 It has not always been the case: in the years immediately following Egan, the Executive appropriately
appealed to it in security clearance or background check cases. See, e.g., Brief for Appellees, Stehney v. Perry,
101 F.3d 925 (3d Cir. 1996) (No. 96-5036); Brief for Appellees at 11–12, Ryan v. Reno, 168 F.3d 520 (D.D.C.
Sept. 24, 1998) (No. 98-5036), 1998 WL 35240401. The Department of Justice still uses it in access-related
contexts. See, e.g., Brief of Defendant-Appellee at 32, Toy v. Holder, 714 F.3d 881 (5th Cir. Oct. 23, 2012) (No.
12-20471), 2012 WL 5294782, at *32. Over the past decade, however, the government has increasingly begun to
claim that the case supports a broad reading of Executive Branch power and expected judicial deference. See,
e.g., Brief for the Petitioners at 42, Kerry v. Din, 576 U.S. 86 (Nov. 26, 2014), (No. 13-1402), 2014 WL
6706838, at *42; Brief for the United States at 23, Gen. Dynamics Corp. v. United States, 563 U.S. 478 (Dec. 13,
2010) (Nos. 09- 1298, 09-130), 2010 WL 5099376, at *23; Reply Brief for Defendant-Appellants at 12-13,
ACLU v. U.S. Dep’t of Def., 901 F.3d 125 (2d Cir. Nov. 3, 2017) (No. 17-779), 2017 WL 5152276, at *12-13;
Brief for Respondents-Appellants at 41–42, 48, Dhiab v. Obama, 787 F.3d 563 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 6, 2015) (No. 145299), 2015 WL 1004459, at *41–42, *48; Brief of the Plaintiff-Appellee at 115, United States v. Sedaghaty, 728
F.3d 885 (9th Cir. Aug. 3, 2012) (No. 11-30342), 2012 WL 3342732, at *115; Brief for the Appellees at 17, 19,
34, Tenenbaum v. U.S. Dep’t of Def., 407 Fed. App’x 4 (6th Cir. Dec. 2, 2009) (No. 09-1992), 2009 WL
4831977; Brief for the Defendants-Appellants at 42–43, John Doe Inc. v. Mukasey, 549 F.3d 861 (2d Cir. Feb.
14, 2008) (No. 07-4943), 2008 WL 6082598, at *42–43.
138 See Egan, 484 U.S. at 526; 5 U.S.C.A. §§ 7511–14, 7531–33 (West).
139 See 5 U.S.C.A. §§ 7513(d), 7532(c).
140 Egan, 484 U.S. at 530–32.
141
Id. at 527.
142 Id. at 528.
143 This problem, while most pronounced in regard to Egan, is not limited to that case. Another case frequently
cited in support of overbroad Executive Branch authorities is CIA v. Sims, 471 U.S. 159 (1985). In that case,
individuals were seeking access to the names and institutional affiliations of those working on MKULTRA. Id. at
178–79. The Court noted that “Congress did not mandate the withholding of information that may reveal the
identity of an intelligence source; it made the Director of Central Intelligence responsible only for protecting
against unauthorized disclosures.” Id. at 180. The Court went on to suggest, “[I]t is the responsibility of the
Director of Central Intelligence, not that of the judiciary, to weigh the variety of complex and subtle factors in
determining whether disclosure of information may lead to an unacceptable risk of compromising the Agency’s
intelligence-gathering process.” Id. Although the holding was appropriately narrow (“We hold that the Director
of Central Intelligence properly invoked § 102(d)(3) of the National Security Act of 1947 to withhold disclosure
of the identities of the individual MKULTRA researchers as protected “intelligence sources.” Id. at 181), the
Government looks to the case in support of broad judicial deference to the Executive Branch whenever national
136
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decision “the narrow question presented by this case.”144 The statute in question did not
transfer control over security clearances to the board, as access to classified material within
the Executive Branch is overseen by the agency most directly involved in the sensitive
areas.145
The tension between the FISC as an Article III entity and its handling of classified material,
and how it is resolved, has far-reaching implications for the rule of law. It is a foundational
tenet in Western democracies that for law to be legitimate, it must be known and promulgated.
Some scholars go so far as to suggest that failure to do so may result in something not properly
called law at all.146 To the extent that FISC/FISCR opinions establish law, as they increasingly
do, it becomes ever more important for this information to be public. As the foreign
intelligence courts are increasingly put into a position of having to conduct oversight of the
Executive, moreover, and to respond to Executive Branch malfeasance, there is a deeply
democratic concern about whether the government should be able to control who sees judicial
opinions that reveal the extent to which the government is acting within the law.
D. Standing
The special status of the FISC/FISCR as a specialized court—particularly one that deals with
classified material—and its Article III status has also presented in regard to standing. Statutory
provisions require in camera and ex parte proceedings, as well as the sealing of certain records
as they are passed up the chain of review. Yet the courts’ decisions create precedent and
operate as working law, with their contours having a direct impact on the rights of third
parties—i.e., individuals who are not part of the application or certification processes. This
tension results in numerous questions about who has the right to see the decisions of the court
and the information on which those determinations are based.
The question came to the fore on the heels of the predecessor to the 2008 FAA, when Judge
Reggie Walton held that Yahoo! could challenge directives under the 2007 Protect America
Act (PAA) as violative of its customers’ Fourth Amendment rights.147 The court read the
statutory language, which contemplated companies refusing to comply with directives as
sufficient to address third party rights.148 For the court, an unconstitutional directive could not
be considered lawful, regardless of whose rights had been violated.149
Upon review, FISCR Judge Bruce M. Selya held that the communications service provider
had standing to challenge the legality of directives issued pursuant to PAA.150 The court
security matters are on the line. See, e.g., DEP’T OF JUST., GUIDE TO THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT,
EXEMPTION 1, at 15–16 & n.77 (2019), https://www.justice.gov/oip/page/file/1197091/download
[https://perma.cc/X8K3-SXVY] (citing CIA v. Sims in support of the proposition that the judiciary is and ought to
be extremely deferential to the executive when national security matters are on the line).
144 Egan, 484 U.S. at 520.
145 Id. at 530–32.
146 See, e.g., LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 39, 47 (1964).
147 Memorandum Opinion, In re Directives to Yahoo!, Inc. Pursuant to Sec. 105B of the Foreign Intel.
Surveillance Act, No. 105B(g): 07-01, GID.C.00025, at 43 (FISA Ct. Apr. 25, 2008) (Walton, J.) (GID.C.000238
is the same opinion, but with different redactions).
148 Id. at 54; see 50 U.S.C.A. § 1805(b)(g) (West) (“In the case of a failure to comply with a directive . . . [t]he
court shall issue an order requiring the person to comply with the directive if it finds that the directive was issued
in accordance with subsection (e) and is otherwise lawful.”)
149 In re Directives, GID.C.00025, at 45.
150 In re Directives to Yahoo! Inc. Pursuant to Sec. 105B of Foreign Intel. Surveillance Act, 551 F.3d 1004, 1009,
GID.CA.00002, at 10 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2008) (Selya, J.).
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pointed to the statutory language permitting a provider receiving a directive to challenge the
legality of that directive.151 The provider risked injury by assuming the burden it would have
to shoulder to facilitate the government's request—an injury caused by the government and
redressable by the court.152
Two key developments subsequent to those cases had a profound impact on the more recent
standing questions to come before the FISC/FISCR: first, the Supreme Court’s decision in
Clapper v. Amnesty International; and, second, the release of the Snowden documents and
what they did to demonstrate an injury-in-fact.
Clapper involved a challenge to the constitutionality of Section 702.153 The plaintiffs admitted
to not knowing anything specific about how the targeting practices worked but provided
evidence that (a) they had engaged in communications that came within Section 702 purview;
(b) the government had a strong motive to intercept the communications because of the subject
matter/identities; (c) the government had already intercepted a large number of calls and
emails involving a person who communicated regularly with the plaintiff; and (d) the
government had the capacity to intercept the communications.154 The Court determined that
the plaintiffs’ evidence was inadequate to establish standing because they relied on a “highly
attenuated chain of possibilities” and displayed “no actual knowledge” as to whether plaintiffs
ever specifically targeted.155
Less than four months after the Court issued its opinion in Clapper, the Snowden documents
burst on the scene.156 On June 6, 2013, the Guardian carried the first item: the now-infamous
Section 215 secondary order showing that the National Security Agency (NSA) was collecting
metadata from millions of Verizon customers, including from calls entirely within the United
States.157 The next day, the Washington Post and others reported that the NSA was accessing
data through back doors into U.S. internet companies like Google and Facebook via PRISM.158
The following day, the papers revealed that over a thirty-day period, some 97 billion internet
data records and 124 billion telephony data records had been collected.159 Inside the U.S.,
See 50 U.S.C.A. § 1861(f)(2)(A)(i) (“A person receiving a production order may challenge the legality of the
production order or any nondisclosure order . . . by filing a petition.”); id. § 1881a(i)(4)(A) (“An electronic
communication service provider receiving a directive . . . may file a petition to modify or set aside such directive
with the [FISC], which shall have jurisdiction to review such petition.”)
152 In re Directives, 551 F.3d at 1008-09, GID.CA.00002, at 8–10.
153 Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 404 (2013).
154 Id. at 425–30 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
155 Id. at 410–11 (majority opinion).
156 For a detailed discussion of the documents released by Edward Snowden, the former Booz Allen Hamilton
defense contractor at the National Security Agency, see generally BARTON GELLMAN, DARK MIRROR: EDWARD
SNOWDEN AND THE AMERICAN SURVEILLANCE STATE (2020); GLENN GREENWALD, NO PLACE TO HIDE: EDWARD
SNOWDEN, THE NSA, AND THE U.S. SURVEILLANCE STATE (2014); EDWARD JAY EPSTEIN, HOW AMERICA LOST ITS
SECRETS: EDWARD SNOWDEN, THE MAN AND THE THEFT (2017).
157 See Glenn Greenwald, NSA Collecting Phone Records of Millions of Verizon Customers Daily, GUARDIAN
(June 6, 2013), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/06/nsa-phone-records-verizon-courtorder [https://perma.cc/UN4Q-874P].
158 See Barton Gellman, U.S., British Intelligence Mining Data from Nine U.S. Internet Companies in Broad
Secret Program, WASH. POST (June 7, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/us-intelligencemining-data-from-nine-us-internet-companies-in-broad-secret-program/2013/06/06/3a0c0da8-cebf-11e2-8845d970ccb04497_story.html [https://perma.cc/97B7-B8UE]; Glenn Greenwald & Ewen MacAskill, NSA Prism
Program Taps in to User Data of Apple, Google and Others, GUARDIAN (June 7, 2013),
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some 3 billion data elements were captured over a thirty-day period ending March 2013, giving
the NSA more information on Americans inside the United States than Russia had over its
citizens. On June 20, 2013, a Section 702 FISC order from 2010 approving targeting
procedures, as well as the 2009 minimization procedures appeared, and, a week later, articles
reported that the NSA was collecting and storing large quantities of Americans’ Internet
metadata.160
Over the following months, the Washington Post, New York Times, Guardian, and others
published more information on Section 702 upstream collection, NSA monitoring of
Americans’ email and text communications into and out of the country, warrantless searches,
access to smartphones, monitoring of banking and credit institutions, collection of contact
lists, and the augmentation of all of this data with other public and commercial sources to
develop sophisticated pictures of citizens’ social relationships. When information began to
emerge about the extent of surveillance overseas, even America’s closest allies began to
express alarm.161
The political climate shifted, with implications for all three branches of government. Within
hours of the first leak, the Director of National Intelligence issued press releases
acknowledging the Section 215 and Section 702 programs.162 Soon thereafter, President
Obama ordered the declassification of scores of documents.163 In August, ODNI launched a
Tumblr account, “IC on the Record,” to provide more information and to make its case in the
intense public debates that ensued.164 The President simultaneously assembled a Review
Group on Intelligence and Communications Technologies, which in December 2013 formally
160
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issued forty-six recommendations—including significant reforms of foreign intelligence
surveillance directed at U.S. persons.165 The Privacy and Civil Liberties Board went from
being underfunded and inactive to issuing its first, scathing report, centered on Section 215
collection and operation of the FISC.166 To assuage the alarm being expressed by allies, Obama
issued a new Presidential Policy Directive, underscoring that U.S. signals intelligence
activities would henceforth “take into account that all persons should be treated with dignity
and respect, regardless of their nationality or wherever they might reside, and that all persons
have legitimate privacy interests in the handling of their personal information.”167 Special
limitations would apply.
The legislature, too, became swept up in the political fallout. Scores of bills proposing farreaching reforms suddenly appeared before Congress: from just three bills that had been
brought forward the prior year (June 2012–May 2013), when specific clauses in FISA had
actually been up for renewal, compared with the twelve months following the leaks, in which
forty-two bills were before Congress, calling for everything from the elimination of the
FISC/FISCR to a radical overhaul of FISA. Ultimately, Congress settled on the USA
FREEDOM Act, which, inter alia, prohibited bulk collection under Section 215, FISA pen
register/trap and trace authorities, and National Security Letters; required the appointment of
at least five amici to address novel questions of law; required the Attorney General to submit
any FISC/FISCR decision or order with a significant interpretation of FISA to Congress; and
required a number of reports related to the operation of FISA authorities.168
The judiciary did not remain immune. In non-specialized Article III courts, a slew of cases
challenged the constitutionality of the surveillance programs. It started the same day the
Guardian published the secondary order, with Klayman I filed in D.D.C. against Section
215.169 On June 11, 2013, the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) filed in S.D.N.Y.,
seeking a declaratory judgment that the NSA collection program exceeded the statutory
authority and violated both the First and Fourth Amendments.170 The following day Anna
Smith, a neo-natal intensive care nurse in Spokane, filed a complaint in Idaho, requesting that
the district court enjoin the NSA from collecting and analyzing her telephone data.171 In July,
EPIC filed in the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to demand that the FISC order be
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vacated,172 and twenty-two organizations filed suit in the Northern District of California,
asserting First Amendment violations.173
Like its sistren, the FISC found itself in the middle of a maelstrom. For thirty-five years, there
had been no public filings before the FISC. But within days of the first leak, they began. On
June 10, 2013, the ACLU and Yale Media Freedom Information Access Clinic (MFIAC)
entered a motion to obtain FISC opinions that evaluated the meaning, scope, and/or
constitutionality of Section 215.174 Over the next few weeks, sixteen members of the U.S.
House of Representatives filed an amicus brief in support of the motion, as did a number of
advocacy organizations, such as the Center for Democracy and Technology (CDT), the EFF,
and the First Amendment Coalition.175 On July 15, 2013, they were joined by a formidable
group of media representatives which included, inter alia, the Reporters Committee, ABC
News, the Associated Press, Bloomberg News, Dow Jones & Company, Reuters, National
Public Radio, the Los Angeles Times, The New Yorker, Newsweek, the Washington Post, and
others.176
With an eye towards their outraged customer base, corporate America engaged. On June 14,
2013, just over a week after the first article appeared, Yahoo! moved the court under FISC
Rule 62(a) to request publication of an April 2008 opinion, which had been appealed to the
FISCR and referenced in In re Directives, 551 F.3d 1004 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2008).177 Five days
later, Microsoft requested permission to disclose aggregate information regarding the FISC
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orders it had received.178 Google, Facebook, and LinkedIn later entered similar motions.179
Further filings and motions to the court to obtain opinions and orders continued into the
autumn and beyond.180
As a result of these motions, the court immediately had to address questions of standing. It
was an area fraught with tension, particularly in light of the recent Clapper decision which
had predated the unprecedented public access to the surveillance programs underway.
In September 2013, although the Government argued that the ACLU and Yale MFIAC had
not been a party to the original judicial determination about bulk collection and therefore
lacked standing, Judge Saylor found otherwise. Quoting Clapper, he noted, “To establish
Article III standing, an injury must be concrete, particularized, and actual or imminent; fairly
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traceable to the challenged action; and redressable by a favorable ruling.”181 The injury caused
by withholding the opinions was actual, as they were not, in fact, available to the public, the
concern could be alleviated by the court, and the injury was sufficiently concrete and
particularized because release would enhance the public debate and, in particular, the ACLU’s
activities. Withholding the opinions, on the other hand, was detrimental, because, the
“ACLU’s active participant in the legislative and public debates about the proper scope of
Section 215 and the advisability of amending that provision is obvious from the public
record.”182
Judge Saylor determined that the other movant, Yale MFIAC, though, had neither indicated
how release of information would aid its activities nor how failure to release opinions would
be detrimental. The clinic had not participated in public debate about Section 215 and
therefore, lacking a concrete and particularized injury, did not have standing.183 Nearly a year
later, the court granted a motion for reconsideration of the clinic’s dismissal.184 The decision
recognized the recently-decided case, Company Doe v. Public Citizen, in which consumer
advocacy organizations had asserted both a common law and First Amendment right of access
to sealed documents.185 The Fourth Circuit had held that the groups had standing under Article
III: “Their informational interests, though shared by a large segment of the citizenry, became
sufficiently concrete to confer Art. III standing when they sought and were denied access to
the information they claimed a right to inspect.”186 In the case of the FISC, the Court concluded
in regard to the ACLU/MFIAC motion that principles of comity required that the motion be
denied to the extent that it concerned FISC opinions at issue in separate suit brought by the
ACLU in October 2011 in the Southern District of New York.187
On Nov. 7, 2013, the ACLU and Yale MFIAC filed another motion for declassification of
opinions addressing bulk collection.188 Two of the four opinions that the government
determined were responsive to the request had already been made public in redacted form
pursuant to FISCR Rule of Procedure 62(a).189 The other two were subsequently released by
the government in redacted form.190 It was not until January 25, 2017 that the court ruled that
the movants lacked standing for First Amendment right of access to the opinions.191 FISC
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Presiding Judge Rosemary Collyer determined that the movants failed the experience and logic
tests for a First Amendment qualified right of access.192
Meeting en banc, the FISC overturned the decision (6-5), saying that the standing requirement
was satisfied.193 The court recognized that proper analysis turns on whether the injury is
concrete and actual, assuming the claim has merit. In this case, the movants lacked access to
the classified opinions, satisfying the injury-in-fact requirement.194 Judge Collyer certified the
question to the FISCR on the grounds that it “would serve the interests of justice, a dispositive
issue about standing was involved, and the split among the FISC Judges was very close and
involved a difference of opinion about the law to apply, among other considerations.”195
On January 9, 2018, the FISCR accepted certification and publicly appointed an amicus
curiae.196 On March 16, 2018, the FISCR, agreeing with the en banc Court, held that Movants
had met the requirements for standing.197 Denial of access to the redacted materials constituted
an injury-in-fact. For standing purposes, the movants “need not show that they are ultimately
entitled to access the materials in question. Instead, they need only show that their claim is not
immaterial nor wholly insubstantial and frivolous.”198 The court explained, “The movants have
demonstrated that their claimed right of access is judicially cognizable, and we agree with the
FISC majority that their claim cannot be characterized as ‘completely devoid of merit,’ or
‘wholly insubstantial and frivolous,’ even though it may ultimately be determined to be legally
unsound.199 The court reached neither the merits of the movants’ claims nor jurisdictional
issues.
Along with direct efforts to obtain documents from the court, which necessarily implicated
questions of standing, following the publication of the foreign intelligence programs, motions
began to appear requesting to intervene in cases. In 2015, for instance, Judge Michael Mosman
exercised his discretion sua sponte to dismiss one such request, without reaching the standing
question.200
E. Subject Matter Jurisdiction
Numerous cases have dealt with FISC jurisdiction over FISA-specific electronic surveillance,
physical search, PRTT, business records, and review of Section 702 certifications; targeting
procedures; and minimization.201 A few cases address jurisdiction over outstanding matters
once Congress removes the original authority. At the expiration of the PAA, for example, the
FISA Court held that it retained jurisdiction even after the statute lapsed because it ordered
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that the directives remain in effect until their expiration.202 This included jurisdiction over
reviewing revised or additional procedures during the interim period.203 Similarly, in the USA
FREEDOM Act, Congress provided for a 180-day grace period before bulk collection
ended.204 The opinion, authored by Judge Mosman, began: “‘Plus ça change, plus c'est la
même chose,’ well, at least for 180 days.”205 The determination of whether the court extends
subject matter jurisdiction over a government request for surveillance or a court order evokes
statutory questions about the subject matter before the court. Here, as the next Part discusses,
the key question often turns on whether the technologies involved fit the statutory language or
are able to cabin the amount and type of information sufficiently to ensure that the collection
comports with FISA.
III. Cluster 2: New Technologies / Old Statutory Language
The second cluster of opinions centers on clarifying the type of surveillance allowable under
FISA. Many of these appear to come about because of the basic question: how do new
technologies fit with old statutory language? This impacts the type of information to be
obtained, how it is to be collected, retained, accessed, and shared, and the ways in which
technology can (or cannot) be used to limit collection or to ensure that certain information
does not end up getting stored, analyzed, and shared. Three characteristics of technology drive
the tension that marks this area.
First, technology changes the information available. Volume is the most obvious shift.
Collecting information about one telephone call is quantitatively and qualitatively different
from collecting all telephone calls that an individual, much less an entire city or country,
makes. The shifting nature of information extends beyond this, as the type of data that can be
collected also changes. Previously, geolocational data, detailed mapping of social
relationships, and certain religious and medical information was unavailable. Now it is
available, along with sophisticated algorithms that generate more insight into what people do,
think, and believe and, critically, are likely to do, think, and believe, in the future. The key
question that the court has to confront here is whether the type of information being proposed
for collection is the type of information anticipated by the statute. What constitutes “electronic
surveillance” in a digital age? What about dialing, routing, addressing, and signaling
information (DRAS)? Or content versus non-content? These distinctions matter, because
which statutory language applies, and what steps the government has to go through to get the
data, changes depending on how it is characterized.
Second, how information can be obtained is rapidly changing in a way not contemplated by
the statute. But the manner in which information is collected determines which statutory
provision applies—and, consequently, how to analyze it under the First or Fourth Amendment
as statutorily required by FISA. For instance, are searches of mobile devices physical
searches, and thus within Title III, or ELSUR, and thus subject to Title I? What about
intercepts? Stored communications? Business records? How should chats be considered, or
communication within online gaming systems? What constitutes a “search” for Fourth
Amendment purposes?
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Third, FISC/FISCR jurisprudence makes apparent that technology also limits the ability of the
government to meet constitutional requirements. What should the court do when confronted
by the government’s ability to collect data, but inability to determine crucial information about
the target, such as their identity or location? What if the facility can be targeted, but the user
cannot be confirmed? The same issue presents with the question of content versus non-content:
how should the court handle post-cut-through-dialed-digits, or multi-communication
transactions carrying entirely domestic conversations? What about the problem of complicated
technologies that carry unintended consequences, or overcollection? How should the court
deal with this in light of the statutory regime?
Technology is catapulting forward at a lightning rate. The average product life cycle in Silicon
Valley is a matter of months. Title I has remained largely unchanged since 1978. Even the
most recent major revisions were in 2015, six years ago. The government must adapt to the
risks posed by these technologies, even as it uses them to try to head off national security
threats. A growing body of jurisprudence addresses efforts by the court to reconcile the
resulting tension between new technologies and swiftly antiquated statutory language.
A. Electronic Surveillance and Physical Search
The FISC, on multiple occasions, has acknowledged its jurisdiction over applications for
electronic surveillance (ELSUR).206 For Title I, probable cause applies to each of the facilities
to be surveilled.207 But interpretive problems have been caused by new technologies and
collection techniques. What constitutes a “facility”? What falls within ELSUR? What is the
line between ELSUR and physical search? The stakes are high: things that do not come within
the statutory definition are outside the court’s purview.
Title I of FISA requires that the government establish probable cause that the foreign power
(FP) or agent of a foreign power (AFP) being targeted will use the facility to be placed under
surveillance.208 The natural question then becomes, what is a facility? In 2007, the Justice
Department’s National Security Division proposed a change that would have eviscerated
statutory protections. It argued that for electronic intercept of Internet communications, an
entire cablehead or gateway should be considered a “facility” within the meaning of FISA.
Because the Government could demonstrate that FP/AFPs use the Internet, the Justice
Department argued the court should make a probable cause finding in regard to the facility
generally and leave it to the government to determine specific targets, which communications
206
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related to them should be collected, and the like. This would have shifted analysis to the
minimization procedures, making them something exercised by the executive branch—not an
aspect of judicial review. To accept this reading, the court would have had to find that the
backbone of the Internet was the facility under which surveillance would be directed.
Judge Vinson rejected this interpretation. Even if surveillance occurred on the backbone, the
government would not be acquiring everything travelling across the circuit. Instead, only
content to or from particular phone numbers or addresses would be obtained. He therefore
understood those particular numbers as the facility being targeted. Zooming out and applying
probable cause, the government’s interpretation would create a disconnect between the court’s
probable cause finding, who was actually being targeted for surveillance, and what was being
required. As a textual analysis, if the government was only acquiring a small fraction of the
communications at a larger facility, and selecting communications by reference to other,
smaller facilities (like phone numbers), then the facilities at which the acquisition of the
communications is being directed are the smaller facilities. The court rejected the
government’s request.209
The volume of information that would thereby be obtained under the government’s
interpretation, and the implications for U.S. citizens’ communications flowing into and out of
the U.S., raised jurisdictional concerns. The court wrote:
[G]iven the large number of selectors involved [REDACTED] it appears likely that
this surveillance would acquire some indeterminate number of communications to
or from persons in the United States. See, e.g., id. at 6-8. [REDACTED] In view of
this apparent likelihood, the government’s implicit request that the Court exercise
jurisdiction over the submitted application, the Court’s prior acceptance of
jurisdiction in Docket No. [REDACTED] and prior decisions of this court that have
accepted jurisdiction in similar cases [REDACTED] I assume for purposes of this
order and opinion that this case does involve “electronic surveillance” as defined by
FISA, such that this Court has jurisdiction. However, I believe that the jurisdictional
issues regarding the application of FISA to phone numbers and e-mail addresses that
are used exclusively outside the United States merit further examination.210
In 2019, the issue again arose in the context of the statutory requirement that the facilities at
which ELSUR is directed must be used (or be about to be used) by the target of the
surveillance.211 The court appointed amici curiae to assist, one of whom took the position that
the proposed facility did not meet the statutory definition. The amicus argued for a narrow
interpretation of “facilities” to ensure that FISA be applied with caution in a technological
context that could not be foreseen when the statute was first enacted. Presiding Judge
Rosemary Collyer concluded otherwise, stating that Congress “did not intend the term
‘facilities’ in § 1805(a)(2)(B) to be interpreted in that narrow fashion.212 To support its broad
reading of the term, the court looked to the dictionary from 1976, which defined facility in
209
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relevant part as “the means used to facilitate an action or process; convenience; provision: the
facilities of a library.”213 Judge Collyer further noted that the statutory language (which
referred to “the facilities or places”) suggested that Congress meant it to apply widely.214 She
also noted that while the meaning of what constituted a facility for ELSUR may have been
fixed at the time when the statute was enacted, new applications of the term could arise in
light of new technologies.215
The most remarkable part of the decision is that the court went on to rule that the statutory
requirement that probable cause apply to “each” facility did not mean that it had to apply to
“all” facilities; instead, the court determined that the probable cause standard “requires only a
fair probability.”216 The new technology essentially made it possible to target multiple
facilities, but then failed to provide a way to delimit the number of facilities thus surveyed.
Because the government stated that it could not separately target each facility “without altering
the manner in which the surveillance would be conducted,” instead of rejecting the use of the
technology to carry out the surveillance, the court relaxed the probable cause “each”
requirement.217 The case is a great example of the problem created where technology allows
for acquisition but not specificity in a manner that comports with the statutory language.
Which collection techniques fall within the definition of ELSUR matters because whether the
court has jurisdiction over the type of communication in question turns, at least for purposes
of Title I, on the status of those communications. In one heavily redacted opinion, it appears
that the government interpreted the statutory provisions in a manner with which the court
disagreed, issuing “an order authorizing electronic surveillance . . . of all communications to
or from” a particular facility.218 The court objected on the grounds that it did not have
jurisdiction over the type of foreign intelligence collection it was being asked to authorize.219
In another opinion, the court held that the type of surveillance requested did constitute
“electronic surveillance” as defined in FISA, but it was not clear who constituted the type of
carrier contemplated by the statute.220
The language of some of the opinions suggests that the government is trying to bring collection
otherwise conducted outside the statute into the FISA framing—which is consistent with Jack
Goldsmith’s discussion of his time at OLC.221 For instance, in one opinion whose date is
redacted (likely 2005), the court set out its reasons for adding clarification for its jurisdiction
and the scope of its authorization into the surveillance order language.222 In this case, the court
was focused on an FBI application. The judge wrote that the court did not have jurisdiction,
“to authorize the acquisition of wire communications that fall outside the applicable” statutory
language.223 The Court also recognized that the “Executive Branch has long asserted the
213
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authority, consistent with but outside of FISA, to acquire [REDACTED] other than those
described in [REDACTED].224
As with the definition of ELSUR and facilities, FISC opinions that have been made public
demonstrate a struggle with how to incorporate mobile technologies and roving surveillance
into the statutory language.225 Judge Thomas Hogan’s opinion that the government had
exceeded the scope of its statutory authorization provides one example.226
So, too, does the line between ELSUR and physical search fall under pressure in the context
of new technologies. In one case that the court confronted, the government argued, based on
the use of the term “intercept” in FISA legislative history and Title III of the Omnibus Crime
Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, that it should be understood in a particular manner.227
With an eye towards new technologies, it is worth mentioning that, to the extent that
information is obtained directly from a mobile device itself, as opposed to communications
obtained in transit (e.g., Section 702 upstream collection), then a colorable argument could be
raised that what is happening is actually a physical search, which must comport with Title III.
While there is no released opinion that appears to address this, it would match with the general
tension in this category. If you are getting information directly from a device, then it is not an
intercept. Simultaneously, it is different from the type of search (i.e., of real property) that
drove the language in the 1994 Act. A similar, colorable argument could be raised for search
of any stored data.
As a matter of physical search, the FISC determined in 1981 that it did not have authority for
physical searches under ELSUR.228 The distinguishing factor was whether the court could
authorize the search of real property. The FISC determined that “the clearly expressed intent
of Congress to withhold authority to issue orders approving physical searches” makes it moot
to “consider whether a judge of the FISC nevertheless has some implied or inherent authority
to do so.”229 It continued, “[W]here a given authority is denied it cannot be supplied by resort
to principles of inherent, implied or ancillary jurisdiction.”230 This holding suggests that the
government had been arguing that the Court could grant physical search warrants by nature of
its status as an Article III court. After Congress amended FISA, following the Aldrich Ames
investigation, to allow for physical search, the court acknowledged that its jurisdiction
extended to granting warrants to search real property.231
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B. Pen Register and Trap and Trace Devices
A number of the opinions that are publicly available center on pen register/trap and trace
(PRTT).232 As a matter of the incorporation of new technologies into the statutory language,
the court has had to address at least three prominent issues: email and Internet metadata,
content versus non-content, and post-cut-through-dialed-digits (PCTDDs).
Perhaps the most significant opinion in this realm was the decision by Judge Colleen KollarKotelly sometime in or around 2004, which transferred parts of the Terrorist Surveillance
Program to the FISA framing.233 It appears to be the first opinion to expand PRTT beyond
individual targets. The document notes that the government request implicates a “much
broader type of collection than other pen register/trap and trace applications and therefore
presents issues of first impression.”234 The court held that bulk Internet metadata collection
was consistent with 50 U.S.C. Sections 1841–1846 in that it met the definition of what
constitutes a pen register or trap and trace, the type of information to be obtained did not
include the contents of the communications, the type of data constituted dialing, routing,
address, or signaling information (DRAS), and the manner in which it would be obtained was
consistent with the statute.235 It is not clear from the redacted version whether the court
considered how Internet information could be construed differently because of the type of
information that was revealed. Subject information in an email, for instance, frequently reveals
what the message is about—indeed, that is the whole point of the subject line. So, too, does
knowing which URLs or websites are visited indicate the content of the material being
accessed.
The court, nevertheless, held that the restrictions on retention, accessing, use, and
dissemination of such information satisfies the requirements of 50 U.S.C. § 1842, and that the
installation and use of the PRTT devices for bulk email and Internet metadata collection is
consistent with the First and Fourth Amendments—despite the acknowledgment that “The raw
volume of the proposed collection is enormous,” and will result in the collection of USPs
inside the country “who are not the subject of any FBI investigation.”236
The problem with other data being collected along with DRAS was presented to the court
sometime between 2010 and 2013. Judge Bates noted that the court had set certain categories
that the government could collect, and others which it could not—but that the government had
not abided by the order. According to Judge Bates, “the government acknowledges that NSA
232
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exceeded the scope of authorized acquisition continuously during the more than
[REDACTED] years of acquisition under these orders.”237 Although the government stated
that “all the technologies used by NSA to implement the authorizations granted by docket
number PR/TT [REDACTED] and previous docket numbers only collect, or collected,
authorized metadata,” there had been systemic overcollection continuously since the initial
authorization.238 As a result, nearly every PRTT record generated by the program included
some data that was not authorized for collection.239 A second ruling by Judge Bates addressed
limited collection authority for several categories of metadata collection.240
These opinions generate insight into the difficult role that the court has of ensuring that the
government is collecting and using data in the approved manner. They also illustrate the
challenge of what to do with information collected outside the prescribed limits.241 With very
few exceptions, the government’s position has been to request that it be allowed to keep the
data.
PCTDDs (i.e., the use of numbers on a telephone keypad to navigate commercial activity)
have also caused concern, not least because, by definition, they include content. When a
customer calls the bank and uses the number pad to transfer money from her savings account
to her checking account, she enters her social security number, her bank account number, and
how much money is being transferred. This is content. In 2016, the court had to determine
whether it had the authority to authorize the collection of all PCTDDs under a PRTT order.
The FISCR found in the affirmative—once again, because the technology was not
sophisticated enough to distinguish between content and non-content DRAS—subject to a
prohibition on the affirmative investigative use of any content.242 The court of review also
found that “incidental collection of content information during the collection of post-cutthrough digits . . . is constitutionally reasonable, even when done without a probable-cause
warrant.”243
C. Business Records, Bulk Collection and § 702
A number of opinions accept the proposed minimization procedures for tangible things.244 The
most important law and technology question that arose in this context appears to have been
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whether in Section 215 could be used for bulk collection of internet and telephone metadata.245
However, the first time the court appears to have confronted the issue, it summarily applied
Smith v. Maryland, and, after just a half a page of discussion, it granted the order.246
Further questions accompanied the querying of the data obtained. Training proved a persistent
concern.247 In 2013, the query issue again arose. Judge Claire Eagan determined that noncontent queries met the requirements of the Fourth Amendment.248 Two months later, in
October, Judge McLaughlin agreed with Judge Eagan that collection of bulk telephone
metadata met the Section 215 relevance standard and, under Smith, that the Fourth
Amendment did not apply. Although Justice Sonia Sotomayor had suggested in United States
v. Jones that the Supreme Court may need to revisit third party doctrine, the principle remained
intact.249
Once the statutory language changed in 2015 to prohibit bulk collection, the court had to turn
its attention to the new statutory requirements, as is typical whenever Congress alters FISA.250
One of the most notable decisions at the time was authored by Judge Mosman, who approved
continued retention of bulk telephony metadata under Section 215 after November 28, 2015
and limited access to two purposes: first, for a limited time as a comparison set to verify the
completeness and accuracy of call detail records produced under the targeted (non-bulk)
production orders issued after November 28, 2015; and, second, for retention to comply with
litigation-related obligations.251
In 2015, Judge Hogan also addressed the statutory changes, providing detail about the new
requirements under § 1861.252 The court noted that the statute requires for applications to have
a specific selection term to be used as the basis for production. For production on an ongoing
245
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basis of call detail records, there must also be a statement of facts showing there are reasonable
grounds to believe that the call detail records sought to be produced based on the specific
selection term are relevant to an authorized international terrorism investigation as well as a
reasonable articulable suspicion that those terms are associated with a foreign power.253
In sum, the main emphasis of the court’s jurisprudence in the statutory realm has to do with
how to fit new technologies into the statutory language and, when Congress does alter the
statute, how to implement the new provisions in light of the technologies available. To the
extent that the latter represents an effort by the legislature to get up to speed on new forms of
collection and communication, the basic struggle remains: how to think about the quality of
the information available, how to access it, and how to take account of limitations that would
otherwise protect individuals from undue government surveillance of their private lives.
IV. Cluster 3: Constitutional Rights
The Church Committee hearings, which gave birth to FISA, showed that the intelligence
community had placed Americans under surveillance based on what they said and did—and
with whom. Decisions were made on the basis of political views, and in some cases, religious
beliefs. Targets ranged from the Women’s Liberation Movement to “every Black Student
Union and similar group regardless of their past or present involvement in disorders,” federal
judges, Members of Congress, and political candidates.254 Intelligence collection reflected
partisan politics. In drafting FISA, the Senate thus expressed particular concern “that the
surveillance authorized . . . not result in the retention or dissemination of information which
would adversely affect the exercise of [F]irst [A]mendment rights.”255
Ten separate requirements incorporated into FISA, accordingly, center on the First
Amendment, with the result that every form of surveillance that can target a U.S. person is
explicitly limited. No U.S. person targeted for ELSUR or physical search can “be considered
an agent of a foreign power solely upon the basis of activities protected by the [F]irst
[A]mendment to the Constitution of the United States.”256 Similarly, the Attorney General
can apply for an order or extension of PRTT “provided that [] investigation of a United States
person is not conducted solely upon the basis of activities protected by the [F]irst
[A]mendment to the Constitution.”257 The applicant must certify to the Court that the
investigation is not premised on First Amendment activities.258 Similar requirements mark
applications for business records.259 For Sections 703 and 704, similar to Title I, the judicial
determination as to whether a U.S. person is or is not a foreign power or an agent thereof
cannot be premised solely on First Amendment activities.260
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See id.; 50 U.S.C.A. § 1861(b) (West).
FBI Oversight: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Civ. & Constitutional Rts. of the H.R. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 94th Cong., pt. 3, at 426-27 (1976).
255 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, S. REP. NO. 95-701, at 42 (1978).
256 50 U.S.C.A. § 1805(a)(2); see id. § 1824(a)(2)(A).
257 Id. § 1842(a)(1).
258 Id. § 1843(a).
259 Id. § 1861(a)(1) (stating that the FBI may make an application for an order requiring the production of
tangible things “for an investigation to obtain foreign intelligence information not concerning a United States
person or to protect against international terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities, provided that such
investigation of a United States person is not conducted solely upon the basis of activities protected by the first
amendment.”) The statute also states: “An investigation conducted under this section shall…not be conducted of
a United States person solely upon the basis of activities protected by the first amendment.” Id. § 1861(a)(2).
260 Id. §§ 1881b(c)(2), 1881c(c)(2).
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With such an emphasis on the First Amendment, one might expect, correspondingly, a
significant number of opinions to address it. But, thus far, only two public opinions handle
First Amendment issues in any depth. Indeed, there are triple the number of cases addressing
the First Amendment right of access, which derives not from the associational rights, but from
the right to petition.
What has garnered considerably more attention than either of these areas are concerns related
to the Fourth Amendment. FISA requires that acquisition of foreign intelligence collection
under Section 702 be consistent with the Fourth Amendment.261 Queries of Section 702 data
must also comport with it.262 Government certification must attest that the targeting and
minimization procedures, and guidelines adopted by the Attorney General and the Director of
National Intelligence to ensure compliance, are similarly consistent.263 The court, in turn, must
ascertain whether the targeting, minimization, and querying procedures are consistent with the
Fourth Amendment.264 The statute requires the court, in the event that the clause is not
satisfied, to direct the government to correct any deficiency within 30 days and to “cease, or
not begin, the implementation of the authorization for which such certification was
submitted.”265
Quite apart from the statutory requirements, surveillance must comport with the First and
Fourth Amendments, as well as the other aspects of the Bill of Rights, such as Fifth
Amendment due process rights. Reflecting their changing role from merely granting orders
for narrowly-targeted ELSUR to handling complex surveillance programs impacting millions
of people, the FISC and FISCR have increasingly been forced to address the relationship of
foreign intelligence collection to individual rights.
A. First Amendment Associational Rights
Congress continues to express concern about how FISA impacts free speech and association
and freedom of religion and the press. Senators Patrick Leahy (D-VT) and Mike Lee (R-UT),
arguing for their amendment to the FISA bill (which easily passed the Senate in spring 2020),
emphasized the importance of seeking greater input from amici in all sensitive cases, “such as
those involving significant First Amendment issues—thereby adding a layer of protection for
those who will likely never know they have been targeted for secret surveillance.”266
There is a disconnect, however, between Congress’s emphasis and concerns, and the
intelligence community guidelines and practices that govern foreign intelligence. To some
extent this reflects the broader structure: open source intelligence collection is almost entirely
premised on First Amendment-type activities.267 Neither the Department of Defense manual
governing similar collection nor the Attorney General Domestic Investigations Operations
Guide provide a heightened predication standard for allegations potentially implicating the
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Id. § 1881a(b)(6).
Id. § 1881a(f)(1).
263 Id. § 1881a(h)(2)(A)(iv).
264 Id § 1881a(j)(3)(A).
265 50 U.S.C.A. § 1881a(j)(3)(B).
266 Patrick J. Leahy & Mike Lee, FISA Needs Reform. Our Amendment Would Do That—and Protect
Constitutional Rights, WASH. POST (May 10, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2020/05/10/fisaneeds-reform-our-amendment-would-do-that-protect-constitutional-rights/ [https://perma.cc/TT5Z-2WUD].
267 See, e.g., CIA, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY ACTIVITIES: PROCEDURES APPROVED BY THE ATTORNEY
GENERAL PURSUANT TO EXECUTIVE ORDER 12333, at 14 (Jan. 17, 2017) (basic collection includes publicly
available information), https://repository.library.georgetown.edu/handle/10822/1053881 [https://perma.cc/9JKCNN5Q].
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First Amendment.268 Minimization procedures approved by the court, such as the FBI’s
Section 702 procedures, fail to contemplate the full range of First Amendment activity in their
exposition of sensitive information—which, in any event, can still be retained, analyzed, and
disseminated.269
As a judicial matter, the statute’s emphasis on “solely” has come into play, rendering the
requirement far less effective than it might otherwise be in protecting individual rights. In
2013, Judge Bates determined that the FISC could issue an order for business records even
where “[n]one of the conduct or speech” attributed to the subject of the investigation fell
“outside the ambit of the [F]irst [A]mendment.”270 He looked to “related conduct” by others
which was not constitutionally protected.271 The court considered a statement made by the
target, noting that it “seems to fall well short of the sort of incitement to imminent violence or
‘true threat’ that would take it outside the protection of the [F]irst [A]mendment. The
government’s own assessment of [REDACTED] points to the conclusion that it is protected
speech.”272 Judge Bates reflected, “Under the circumstances, the [c]ourt is doubtful that the
facts regarding [REDACTED] own words and conduct alone establish reasonable grounds to
believe that the investigation is not being conducted solely on the basis of the first
amendment.” 273
Nevertheless, the court read 50 U.S.C. § 1861 as permitting consideration of related conduct
“in determining whether the [F]irst [A]mendment requirement is satisfied.”274 In other words,
the court looked to the conduct of others, together with entirely protected First Amendment
activity, to find that the proposed collection comported with the statutory requirements. Judge
Bates explained:
The text of Section 1861 does not restrict the Court to considering only the activities
of the subject of the investigation in determining whether the investigation is “not
conducted solely on the basis of activities protected by the first amendment.” Rather,
the pertinent statutory text focuses on the character (protected by the first amendment
or not) of the “activities” that are the “basis” of the investigation.275
The activities of a non-U.S. person could be used in conjunction with protected First
Amendment protected activities to target a U.S. person.

DEP’T OF DEF., DOD MANUAL 5240.01: PROCEDURES GOVERNING THE CONDUCT OF DOD INTELLIGENCE
ACTIVITIES (Aug. 8, 2016), https://repository.library.georgetown.edu/handle/10822/1053876
[https://perma.cc/H5DF-CEUK]; FBI, DOMESTIC INVESTIGATIONS AND OPERATIONS GUIDE (2016),
https://repository.library.georgetown.edu/handle/10822/1053180 [https://perma.cc/K25P-VTYU]. Note, however,
that the Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide makes a number of references to the First Amendment in
Parts 1 and 2.
269 § 702 Minimization Procedures (2019)—William P. Barr, Exhibit D: Minimization Procedures Used by the
Federal Bureau of Investigation in Connection with Acquisitions of Foreign Intelligence Information Pursuant to
Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, as Amended, [REDACTED], No.
[REDACTED] (FISA Ct. Sept. 17, 2019), https://repository.library.georgetown.edu/handle/10822/1060321.
270 Opinion, In re Application of the FBI for an Ord. Requiring Prod. of Tangible Things from [REDACTED],
No. BR 13-25, GID.C.00080, at 4 (FISA Ct. Feb. 19, 2013) (Bates, J.) (emphasis added).
271 Id. at 5.
272 Id.
273 Id.
274 Id.
275 Id. According to the application, the government was investigating the target not just based on “his own
personal words and conduct (which, as noted, suggest sympathy toward, if not support of, international
terrorism), but also on the basis of the admitted or suspected [REDACTED].” Id.
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The court has also considered the First Amendment in the context of using PRTT to obtain
Internet metadata.276 The application included the requisite certification that the investigation
of the target, a U.S. person, did not solely rely upon First Amendment-protected activities.
The investigation had been conducted under Executive Order 12333.277 Judge Colleen KollarKotelly suggested that the “unusual breadth” of the proposed collection, “and its relation to
the pertinent FBI investigations” called for further attention to the First Amendment
concerns.278
Usually, PRTT collection would be directed at a particular facility being used by an individual
of investigative interest. In the case before the court, though, the government was directing
collection at metadata. It is not clear how such a shift fit the statutory language. Judge KollarKotelly leapt to the legislative purpose, instead of the actual requirements, suggesting that it
was “best effectuated at the querying stage, since it will be at a point that an analyst queries
the archived data that information concerning particular individuals will first be compiled and
reviewed.”279 It was a remarkable move, since the impact on the target’s First Amendment
activity occurs at the point of collection—not query.
Nevertheless, the Court ordered that the NSA modify its proposed criterion for querying the
archived data to bring it into line with the First Amendment requirement.280 The court applied
the standard articulated by the Supreme Court in Brandenburg v. Ohio, writing:
an e-mail account used by a U.S. person could not be a seed account if the only
information thought to support the belief that the account is associated with
[REDACTED] is that, in sermons or in postings on a web site, the U.S. person
espoused jihadist rhetoric that fell short of “advocacy . . . directed to inciting or
producing imminent lawless action and . . . likely to incite or produce such action.”281
The court also directed the government to address “the general First Amendment implications
of collecting and retaining this large volume of information that is derived, in part, from the
communications of U.S. persons.”282 The government, in turn, acknowledged that surveillance
acquiring “the contents of communications might in some cases implicate First Amendment
interests, in particular the freedom of association,” but then went on minimize any
constitutional intrusion brought about by the collection of non-content addressing
information.283
Bafflingly, the court looked to the Fourth Amendment to determine whether there were any
First Amendment implications, concluding that because metadata did not implicate the former,
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Opinion and Order, [REDACTED], No. PR/TT [REDACTED], GID.C.00091 (FISA Ct. [REDACTED])
(Kollar-Kotelly, J.).
277 Id. at 55.
278 Id. at 56.
279 Id. at 57.
280 Id. at 57–58 (“[REDACTED] will qualify as a seed [REDACTED] only if NSA concludes, based on the
factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent persons act, there are facts
giving rise to a reasonable articulable suspicion that a particular known [REDACTED] is associated with
[REDACTED] provided, however, that an [REDACTED] believed to be used by a U.S. person shall not be
regarded as associated with [REDACTED] solely on the basis of activities that are protected by the First
Amendment.”)
281 Id. at 58 (quoting Brandenberg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (per curiam)).
282 Id. at 66.
283 Id.
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the impact on the latter was only incidental.284 What made this remarkable is that the entire
point of collecting the metadata was to establish associational details—part of the core
protections extended by the First Amendment. Nevertheless, the court determined that a good
faith exception existed, particularly in light of the compelling national security interest at
stake.285
The court remained uneasy, however, about the breadth of information being collected, noting
that such collection carried “with it a heightened risk that collected information could be
subject to various forms of misuse, potentially involving abridgement of First Amendment
rights of innocent persons.”286 So the judge put into place special restrictions on the access,
retention, and dissemination of such information.287 She distinguished what the government
was asking to do from a 1978 case from the District Court in New Jersey, which had held that
a mail cover on a dissident political organization violated the First Amendment.288 In contrast,
in the case before the FISC, the PRTT did not specifically target a political group, and it had
been authorized by statute on the grounds of being relevant to an investigation to protect
against international terrorism.289
The court further pointed to United States v. Falvey, a 1982 case from the Eastern District of
New York, which had upheld FISA provisions as constitutional on their face.290 In that case,
the court noted that Congress put restrictions on the government to prevent political abuse
(e.g., the judge makes the probable cause finding in regard to whether the target is a foreign
power or an agent of a foreign power). “Hence, to obtain a FISA surveillance order, the
Government must provide the FISA judge with something more than the target's sympathy for
the goals of a particular group, in this case, the IRA.”291
To meet any remaining concerns, the court required that a “First Amendment proviso” be
included as part of the “reasonable suspicion” standard querying archived meta data; adopted
a date after which data could not be retained (four and a half years); and enhanced the role of
the NSA Office of General Counsel.292
While only two opinions are available that address First Amendment associational rights, it
appears that on at least one other occasion, the FISC wrestled with similar questions. A Justice
Department Office of Inspector General (IG) report into the use of Section 215 orders for
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288 Id. at 69 n.49 (citing Paton v. La Prade, 469 F. Supp. 773, 780–82 (D.N.J. 1978)).
289 Id.
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Id. (citing United States v. Falvey, 540 F. Supp. 1306, 1314–15 (E.D.N.Y. 1982)).
291 Falvey, 540 F. Supp. at 1314.
292 [REDACTED], GID.C.00091, at 69 n.50; see also Opinion and Order, [REDACTED], No. [REDACTED],
GID.C.00004, at 23-24 (FISA Ct. [REDACTED]) (Baker, J.) (“Where a particular surveillance is especially
likely to acquire communications that pertain to activities protected by the First Amendment, minimization
procedures should be tailored to address the heightened concern that information could be used in a way that
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(quoting S. REP. NO. 95-701, at 42 (1978)); id. (“For a wiretap of ‘a foreign spy acting as a newspaper reporter, . .
. the committee expects that the minimization procedures . . . would be more strict to assure that information
unrelated to his spy activities was not misused.’”) (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 95-1283, pt. 1, at 61 (1978)); id. (“The
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business records, issued in March 2008, took note.293 When a Section 215 request was twice
presented to the FISC, the IG notes, “[o]n both occasions, the FISA Court indicated it would
not sign the order because of First Amendment concerns.”294 Later in the document, the IG
explained, “The FISA Court declined to approve the first application. OIPR and NSLB e-mails
state that the FISA Court decided that ‘the facts were too “thin” and that this request implicated
the target’s First Amendment rights.’”295 The problem was that when FISC refused the FBI
permission to undertake the surveillance, the FBI had simply gone on to use National Security
Letters to get the same information—despite the same First Amendment prohibitions in the
parallel statutes.296
B. First Amendment Right to Petition
Despite the desuetude of the right to petition, the Framers considered it one of the most critical
constitutional protections.297 It surpassed the associative rights (speech, press, and assembly)
in importance.298 It allowed individuals to seek redress for wrongs and “could force the
government’s attention on the claims of the governed when no other mechanism could.”299
Subjects could go directly to the Crown to challenge lesser tribunals and authorities.300
The right to petition is distinct from the other expressive rights in that it protects (a) active
political engagement; (b) directed at a particular body of persons; (c) demanding an action in
response; and (d) not diluted through representation, giving citizens a better opportunity to be
heard.301 It ensures that changes in society are reflected in government.302 It prevents the
government from being the guardian of the collective public will.303 It gives citizens the ability
to act on their concerns.
The right of access to agencies and courts has long been recognized by the Supreme Court as
“part of the right of petition protected by the First Amendment.”304 Citizens cannot petition and
seek redress, if they cannot access the law. The case is even stronger in relation to government
OFF. OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., A REVIEW OF THE FBI'S USE OF SECTION 215 ORDERS FOR
BUSINESS RECORDS IN 2006 (Mar. 2008, as released in redacted form in Feb. 2016),
https://repository.library.georgetown.edu/handle/10822/1058990 [https://perma.cc/TF8Q-FZRR].
294 Id. at 33–34; See also id. at 65 (“the FISA Court had twice declined to approve a Section 215 application
based on First Amendment concerns.”).
295 Id. at 68.
296 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2709(b)(1) (requiring that the FBI certify that the investigation of a U.S. person “is not
conducted solely upon the basis of activities protected by the first amendment to the Constitution of the United
States.”)
297 1 JOHN PHILLIP REID, CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION: THE AUTHORITY OF RIGHTS 4
(1986).
298 See Julie M. Spanbauer, The First Amendment Right to Petition Government for a Redress of Grievances: Cut
from a Different Cloth, 21 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 15, 17, 34–39 (1993); Norman B. Smith, “Shall Make No Law
Abridging . . .”: An Analysis of the Neglected, But Nearly Absolute, Right of Petition, 54 U. CIN. L. REV. 1153,
1165–67 (1986).
299 Gregory A. Mark, The Vestigial Constitution, The History and Significance of the Right to Petition, 66
FORDHAM L. REV. 2153, 2157 (1998).
300 Id. at 2163.
301 Id. at 2157.
302 See Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 545–46 (1945) (Jackson, J., concurring).
303 See id. at 545.
304 Cal. Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 513 (1972). Accord Chambers v. Balt. & Ohio
R.R., 207 U.S. 142, 148 (1907); Bradley v. Pittsburgh Bd. of Educ., 913 F.2d 1064, 1076 (3d Cir. 1990); NAACP
v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 429–30 (1963); see also Carol Rice Andrews, A Right of Access to Court Under the
Petition Clause of the First Amendment: Defining the Right, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 557, 595–625 (1999) (finding
historical, textual, and policy support for reading the First Amendment to include a right of access to the courts).
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malfeasance, where remedies for unlawful conduct create a “constitutional antidote” to
sovereign immunity.305 “These expressly guaranteed freedoms share a common core purpose
of assuring freedom of communication on matters relating to the functioning of government.”306
The First Amendment thus:
embodies more than a commitment to free expression . . . ; it has a structural role to
play in securing and fostering our republican system of self-government. . . . Implicit
in this structural role is not only “the principle that debate on public issues should be
uninhibited, robust, and wide-open,” but also the antecedent assumption that
valuable public debate—as well as other civic behavior—must be informed.307
It protects the “conditions of meaningful communication” by prohibiting the government “from
limiting the stock of information from which members of the public may draw.”308 For court
records, the test is “whether the place and process have historically been open to the press and
general public,” and “whether public access plays a significant positive role in the functioning
of the particular process in question.”309 The courts include witness testimony, voir dire,
preliminary hearings, bail pleas, sentencing hearings, and criminal and civil trials.310
In light of the history and scope of the right to petition, it is not surprising that following the
release of the Snowden documents, numerous motions filed before the FISC demanded a First
Amendment right of access to the court’s opinions and, in some cases, orders. As a result, about
half a dozen FISC/FISCR opinions in the public domain raise the issue. Just two cases reached
the First Amendment question on the merits.
The first, from December 2007, related to an ACLU motion for the release of court orders and
government pleadings that related to the Terrorist Surveillance Program.311 The court
determined that while it had jurisdiction over the motion, no First Amendment right of access
attached.312 At that point, there was no tradition of openness or public access to government
briefing materials. The “experience” test could not be satisfied.313 Similarly, the “logic” test
failed because, focusing on national security concerns, the “detrimental consequences of a
broad public access to FISC proceedings or records would greatly outweigh any such
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308 Id. at 588; id. at 576 (majority); see also Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 762–63 (1972).
309 Press-Enter. Co. v. Superior Ct. (Press-Enterprise II), 478 U.S. 1, 8 (1986); see also id. at 8–10 (discussing the
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311 Specifically, based on statements by government officials, the ACLU sought “the unsealing of (i) orders
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Motion for Release of Ct. Recs., 526 F. Supp. 2d 484, 485 n.2, GID.C.00021, at 1 n.2 (FISA Ct. 2007) (Bates, J.).
312 Id. at 486, GID.C.00021, at 2.
313 Id. at 491-93, GID.C.00021, at 13–15.
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benefits.”314 Even partial releases of declassified information with redactions “may confuse or
obscure, rather than illuminate, the decisions in question.”315
The second case, from February 2020, addressed the aforementioned ACLU/MFIAC motion,
in regard to which the FISCR had previously determined that the movants had standing.316 The
court determined that it had subject matter jurisdiction over the motion, but, largely along the
lines adopted by Judge Bates in the 2007 case, that the First Amendment did not confer a
qualified right of public access to the material sought. Nor, Judge Collyer determined, was
“there reason for the [c]ourt to exercise any discretion” or inherent authority “it may have to
grant the relief requested.”317
In applying the experience-and-logic test to the FISC opinions, the court found itself in a rather
different position than it had been in 2007.318 Hundreds of orders and nearly 80 FISC opinions
were, at that point, in the public domain. Nevertheless, the court determined that it still did not
have a history of openness to its opinions and that much of what was available was because of
the executive branch, and not the court.319
Setting aside for the moment the fact that the executive branch cannot bind an Article III court
in this manner, the court’s assumption was not correct. Of the 88 FISC opinions currently in
the public domain, at least 35% have been released by the FISC, while approximately 40%
have been released in the course of FOIA suits in regular Article III courts. Only some 25%
of the opinions in the public domain had been released in redacted form by the Office of the
Director of National Intelligence, which, in some cases, has been the result of being ordered
to do so by the FISC.
In the 2020 decision, the court went on to find the logic test similarly unsatisfied.320 It reasoned
that release of the requested material could (a) create a chilling effect that could damage
national security interests if the government failed to search or surveil legitimate targets in
order to retain control over sensitive information; (b) create an incentive for the government
to avoid judicial review, and (c) threaten the free flow of information to the FISC needed for
an ex parte proceeding to result in sound decision making and effective oversight.321
The FISCR, on review, declined to consider the merits, dismissing the Petition for lack of
jurisdiction over constitutional claims.322 The court noted three limitations on it: first, that the
issue constitute a case or controversy within the meaning of Article III (given effect by various
judicial doctrines, such as standing, ripeness, mootness, and no advisory opinions); second,
that the action arise under the Constitution, a law, or a treaty of the U.S. or fall within one of
the other enumerated categories of Article III(2); and third, that the action is described by any
jurisdictional statute as the kind of action that Congress intended to be subject to a court’s
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adjudicatory authority.323 For the court, the third category was problematic: movants had not
brought a dispute within one of the statutorily enumerated areas over which the court had
appellate jurisdiction.324 The court explained, “If a dispute is not of the kind that Congress has
determined should be adjudicated, we ‘have no business deciding it, or expounding the law.”325
Further, for the court, the movants themselves were not authorized by Congress through statute
to seek review.326
The FISCR has jurisdiction to review denials of applications, production or nondisclosure
orders (Section 215), directives issued to electronic service providers (Section 702), and orders
approving certifications and targeting, minimization, and querying procedures for Section 702
acquisition.327 FISA also authorizes consideration of questions of law certified by the FISC.328
But FISA is very specific about which parties can come before the court: the government may
file a petition of review and any person receiving a production or nondisclosure order, or an
electronic communication service providers receiving a directive, could come before it.329 No
provision had been statutorily made for parties such as the ACLU or MFIAC to come before
the FISCR. Congress, moreover, had elsewhere given district courts the authority to raise
Constitutional concerns.330
What is surprising about the FISCR’s decision is the assumption that Congress could, by
majority vote, either establish or override a constitutional right to petition. As Judge Bates and
Judge Collyer had previously acknowledged, the movants were trying to exercise a
constitutionally protected right to access judicial documents.331 Congress does not have the
right to take away such a claim.
Though Congress nowhere provided explicitly for the FISC or FISCR to consider Fourth
Amendment rights in relation to Titles I, III, or IV, such constitutional questions nevertheless
are well within the courts’ domain. No one would object on the grounds that Congress had not
specifically empowered the court to consider such claims, as the legislature lacks the power
to divest courts of their ability to handle constitutional matters by mere majority vote.
Specialization does not affect Article III courts’ position as guardians of the Constitution.
Should someone challenge a ruling in the bankruptcy court as a violation of due process, for
instance, it matters naught whether Congress has provided in the statute establishing
bankruptcy courts that they can hear Fifth Amendment arguments.
The FISCR decision also ignored the fact that under the doctrine of inherent powers, other
courts cannot provide relief. Only the FISC and FISCR control their records. That is how the
federal system works. It would be impossible, for instance, to go to Southern District of New
York to petition for the judicial records of the Northern District of California. To obtain relief
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under either common law or the First Amendment right of access, you have to go to the court
that had control over the original determination. The FISCR declined to rely on any ancillary
authority that it had over the petition.332 The decision also sidestepped the common law right
of access claim, which the litigants had not raised, but which the amicus had addressed in
detail.333
Where the decision reflected stronger reasoning was in its observation that an “application
made under this chapter” in 50 U.S.C. § 1803(b) generally refers to government applications
for surveillance—not applications from individuals outside the FISA structure334. But if the
court was right to suggest that FISCR lacked jurisdiction over this particular appeal, then it
simply could not hear the case. This would leave the lower decision intact.
That is not what happened. Instead, the FISC followed the decision by dismissing three
separate motions for access to judicial decisions for lack of jurisdiction.335 The Court held that
“the FISC is not empowered by Congress to consider constitutional claims generally, First
Amendment claims specifically, or freestanding motions filed by persons who are not
authorized by FISA to invoke this Court’s jurisdiction.”336 The court continued that because
the “reasons why the FISCR found it unwarranted to exercise ancillary jurisdiction over the
ACLU motion apply to” the pending motion, “the FISC is foreclosed from doing so here.”337
But if the FISCR did not have jurisdiction over the motion in the first place based on the
argument in regard to the appeal, it is not clear how their opinion could control the FISC in
this regard.
C. Common Law Right of Access
At the founding of the United States, the First Amendment right to petition incorporated the
common law right of access into its auspices. The Supreme Court applies a historical test to
determine common law rights incorporated in the Constitution. It has consistently held, for
instance, that the common law encapsulated in the Seventh Amendment refers to “the common
law of England.”338 In similar fashion, the writ of habeas corpus “became an integral part of
our common-law heritage by the time the Colonies achieved independence.”339 “[A]t the
absolute minimum, the Suspension Clause protects the writ as it existed in 1789.”340 The Court
332
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looked to the writ’s “historical core” to prevent the executive from wrenching habeas from the
Court’s jurisdiction.341 Like habeas, the right of access to judicial opinions arose centuries ago,
becoming “an integral part of our common-law heritage.”342
English common law recognizes and relies upon a public right of access to judicial opinions.
Since the time of Edward II, who ruled England 1307-1327, English judicial records have been
public.343 In 1372, Parliament expanded the common law right of access to include court
records and evidence, even where it might be used as evidence against the Crown.344 Sir
Edward Coke cited the right to the petition as undergirding the rule that records and reports be
available to any English subject to uncover legal precedent:
[W]hensoever a man is enforced to yield a reason of his opinion or judgment, that then
he set down all authorities, precedents, reasons, arguments and inferences whatsoever
that may be probably applied to the case in question.[] These records, for that they
contain great and hidden treasure, are faithfully and safely kept (as they well deserve)
in the King’s Treasury. And yet not so kept but that any subject may for his necessary
use and benefit have access thereunto, which was the ancient law of England, and so
is declared by an act of Parliament in 46 Edw. 3.345
Even the deplorable Star Chamber “heard cases in public.”346 As a consequence, together with
the presence of lawyers, the court’s decisions and their reasoning would be known.347
Common law depended upon the promulgation of judicial decisions, initially for “common
erudition” and thereafter for authoritative case law.348 Genera customes “guided and directed”
the “proceedings and determinations in the king’s ordinary courts of justice.”349 They depended
“upon immemorial usage . . . for their support.”350 Judges served as “the depositary of the laws,”
their decisions providing “the principal and most authoritative evidence” of the law.351
Blackstone noted the importance of public access:
The judgment itself, and all the proceedings previous thereto, are carefully registered
and preserved, under the name of records, in publick repositories set apart for that
particular purpose; and to them frequent recourse is had, when any critical question
arises, in the determination of which former precedents may give light or assistance.352
Judicial decisions were “not only preserved as authentic records in the treasuries of the several
courts,” but they were “handed out to public view in the numerous volumes of reports.”353
According to Blackstone, the reports included “histories of the several cases, with a short
341
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summary of the proceedings, which are preserved at large in the record; the arguments on both
sides; and the reasons the court gave for their judgment.”354 As Greenleaf later summarized,
“[I]n regard to the inspection of public documents, it has been admitted, from a very early
period, that the inspection and exemplification of the records of the king's courts is the common
right of the subject.”355
In recognition of this heritage, U.S. courts have long recognized a common law public right
of access to judicial opinions. In 1834, the Supreme Court unanimously held that a court
reporter could not hold a copyright to judicial records, as they were part of the public
domain.356 No more so could a bookseller hold an exclusive copyright to the written opinions
of state judges: “The whole work done by the judges constitutes the authentic exposition and
interpretation of the law, which, binding every citizen, is free for publication to all, whether it
is a declaration of unwritten law, or an interpretation of a constitution or a statute.”357 As
recognized by lower courts, “The right to examine certain records and papers . . . . exists as to
the books containing the docket or minute entries of the judgments and decrees of the court.”358
State courts followed suit. All persons, even if they were not citizens, had a right to inspect
court records.359 As early as 1894, the District of Columbia recognized public access. The court
denounced a motion for court records to be “preserved in secrecy,” distinguishing between
judicial records and “other mere official records.”360 “The rules of the Patent Office have no
application to the proceedings of this court . . . . They may be very necessary and proper for
conducting the affairs of that office . . . but it does not follow that similar rules should be
adopted and enforced as applicable in an appellate court of record.”361
Permeating these decisions was the understanding that the court’s legitimacy depended upon
open and public access both to its proceedings and to its decisions.362 These principles have
continued to be embraced from the mid-20th century, up through the present day.363
In the latter half of the 20th century, different methods of reproduction brought new questions
to the fore. The courts reiterated the common law right to inspect judicial records. Third parties
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sought non-documentary evidence introduced at trial.364 The courts doubled down, stating,
“[t]he existence of the common law right to inspect and copy judicial records is beyond
dispute.”365 Where denied, it tended to be in the service of competing rights, such as fair trial
or freedom of the press.366 Judges also looked to the role that the documents played in the
adjudicative process and their relationship to substantive rights.367 What was not questioned
was whether the public had a right to actual decisions. To the contrary, since 1834, the courts
have explicitly recognized that judicial opinions belong to the People.368
The First Amendment encapsulates and expands the common law right of access to judicial
opinions; however, the common law right itself still exists. And FISC has had to confront it.
In 2007, Judge Bates responded with his take on the First Amendment right of access: it is
inapplicable to documents traditionally cloaked from public view. “In the FISA context, there
is an unquestioned tradition of secrecy, based on the vitally important need for national
security.”369 FISC/FISCR records are kept under a statutory scheme intended to protect them
from public disclosure. For Bates, there was “no role for this Court independently to review,
and potentially override, Executive Branch classification decisions,” and thus the controlling
statute preempts any right of common law access that might otherwise exist.370
In the ACLU/MFIAC case decided by FISC and FISCR in 2020, the movants did not raise a
common law claim and neither court addressed whether it might apply.371 Nevertheless, Judge
James E. Boasberg in dismissing a suit on the strength of the FISCR First Amendment ruling
suggested that “FISA does not grant the FISC jurisdiction over claims asserting a common-law
right of access either.”372 The common law right, though, does not require any statutory
permission for its enactment. Indeed, it is a judicially-created right of access that dates back
centuries.
D. Fourth Amendment
Numerous opinions issued by the foreign intelligence courts find applications or certifications
consistent with the Fourth Amendment.373 The key questions that the court has wrestled with
in this area have been the significant purpose test, the warrant requirement, what constitutes a
search, the reasonableness requirement, and the contours of probable cause. Underscoring the
importance of FISC/FISCR opinions being made public is how the courts have approached
the constitutional questions, in the process carving out an exception to the warrant requirement
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in the context of national security. These changes, and replacement of the primary purpose
with the significant purpose test, have had a profound impact on U.S. persons’ constitutional
rights.
The key case on the shift from the primary purpose to the significant purpose test famously
came with the FISCR decision In re Sealed Case, which dealt with a Title I order.374 The FISC
had determined that proposed standard minimization procedures (SMPs) were not reasonably
designed because their purpose and technique were not “consistent with the need of the United
States to obtain, produce, or disseminate foreign intelligence information.”375 The court had
blocked intelligence and sharing procedures which the government claimed could be used
primarily for a law enforcement purpose.376 It also had set extensive conditions for information
sharing and coordination under the SMPs, for the first time setting down in a judicial opinion
what the court believed the practice hitherto had been in regard to maintaining the wall
between foreign intelligence and criminal investigations.377
In 2002, the FISCR overturned the lower court’s decision, bringing down the wall that had
previously existed within the Department of Justice and FBI between foreign intelligence
collection and criminal investigations.378 The court held that FISA did not require the
government to demonstrate that its primary purpose in conducting electronic surveillance was
foreign intelligence. The USA PATRIOT Act’s addition of the word “significant” imposed a
requirement that the government have a measurable foreign intelligence purpose, other than
just criminal prosecution of even foreign intelligence crimes.379 “So long as the government
entertains a realistic option of dealing with the [foreign] agent other than through criminal
prosecution, it satisfies” the statutory requirements for acquisition.380
According to the court, SMPs are designed to protect, as far as reasonable, against the
acquisition, retention, and dissemination of nonpublic information that is not foreign
intelligence information.381 Evidence of criminal activity, however, can be retained and
374
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disseminated. SMPs do not limit prosecutorial advice to FBI intelligence officials regarding
the initiation, operation, continuation, or expansion of FISA surveillance.382
Even as it adopted this broad view, the FISCR recognized some limitations: the FISA process
could not be used to investigate ordinary crimes wholly unrelated to foreign intelligence. 383
Where “the FISC has reason to doubt that the government has any real non-prosecutorial
purpose in seeking foreign intelligence information it can demand further inquiry into the
certifying officer's purpose—or perhaps even the Attorney General's or Deputy Attorney
General's reasons for approval.”384
In 2008, a second major Fourth Amendment decision emerged as the FISC recognized a
foreign intelligence exception to the warrant requirement.385 The government had moved to
compel Yahoo!, Inc. to comply with a directive issued pursuant to the Protect America Act of
2007 (PAA).386 The company had refused to comply on the grounds that the directives violated
the statutory language and the Fourth Amendment, as well as separation of powers. 387 It was
a matter of first impression for the court. Although the PAA had sunset, the directives
temporarily remained in effect.388
Ruling on the constitutional question, the court noted that for the exception to apply, it must
be within the 2002 FISCR determination: i.e., a significant purpose must be the acquisition of
foreign intelligence, and “a sufficiently authoritative official must find probable cause to
believe that the target of the search or electronic surveillance is a foreign power or its agent.”389
In United States v. Bin Laden,390 the reasonableness of surveillance targeted at a U.S. person
abroad had taken into account the existence of minimization procedures, the duration of
monitoring, the nature of the threat being investigated, and the extent to which the targeted
facilities were used in support of the activity being investigated.391 For the FISC, the factors
going to the reasonableness determination for the targeting of U.S. persons overseas were
slightly different. They included the minimization procedures, the duration of the surveillance,
authorization by a senior government official, and identification of the facilities to be
targeted.392 As a threshold matter, such surveillance must also meet the criteria of the foreign
intelligence exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement.
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Upon review, in In re Directives, the FISCR determined that the exception was akin to a
“special needs” exception for domestic foreign intelligence collection targeted at foreign
powers or agents of foreign powers outside the U.S.393 The warrant exception is undertaken
for national security purposes (of which the government’s interest is particularly intense) and
involves acquisition from overseas foreign agents or regarding foreign intelligence.394 To
determine the reasonableness of a particular government action, a court must consider the
totality of the circumstances: i.e., the nature of the intrusion and how it is implemented. The
more important the government’s interest, the greater the intrusion that may be constitutionally
tolerated. In the case of national security, “the relevant governmental interest . . . is of the
highest order of magnitude.” 395 The court continued, “Collectively, these procedures require
a showing of particularity, a meaningful probable cause determination, and a showing of
necessity.”396 The duration (90 days) had already been found reasonable, and the risks of error
and abuse are within “acceptable limits and effective minimization procedures are in place.”397
The month after In re Directives issued, the FISC took a similar tack to find that Section 702
certification and targeting and minimization procedures also fell within the foreign
intelligence exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement.398 The court looked to
the pre-targeting determination, the post-targeting analysis, and documentation and oversight
to determine that the procedures met the demands of reasonableness in light of the significance
of the national security interest and the mitigation of unintentional incidental collection by the
retention procedures in place.399
The FISC has also confronted reasonableness in the context of PRTT and search of the
captured data. In the 2016 case In re Certified Question of Law, the FISC had issued an order
approving a PRTT application, including the proviso that the government “not make any
affirmative investigative use of post-cut-through digits acquired through pen register
authorization that do not constitute call dialing, routing, addressing or signaling information,
unless separately authorized by this Court.”400 The order served on the provider required that
it furnish “all information, facilities, or technical assistance necessary to accomplish the
installation and operation of the . . . device(s).”401 That authorization was consistent with prior
practice of the court: as noted by the FISCR, since at least 2006, PRTT orders had authorized
the acquisition of PCTDDs, “while generally prohibiting the use of those digits that do not
constitute dialing information.”402 Throughout that time period, the government had argued
that despite a statutory prohibition that contents not be obtained through PRTT devices, as a
statutory matter, the government was only required to “use technology reasonably available
to it . . . so as not to include the contents of any wire or electronic communications.”403 In light
of the difference in practice between the FISC and ordinary Article III courts, the FISC judge
considered it appropriate to certify the question to the court of the review.
393
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The FISCR determined that the search of PCTDDs is reasonable even without a warrant.404 A
key consideration for the court was that technology that would enable the government to
distinguish between content/non-content DRAS was not available. To distinguish the matter
before the FISC from the ordinary criminal law context, the court looked to:
(1) the paramount interest in investigating possible threats to national security;
(2) the investigative importance of having access to the dialing information provided
by the post-cut-through digits,
(3) the incidental nature of the collection of content information from post-cutthrough digits,
(4) the relatively slight intrusion on privacy entailed by the acquisition of post-cutthrough digits,
(5) the prohibition against the use of any content information obtained from the pen
register or trap-and-trace device,
(6) the steps taken by the government to minimize the dissemination of post-cutthrough digits; and
(7) the fact that FISA pen register interceptions are conducted only with the approval
and under the supervision of a neutral magistrate, in this case a FISC judge.405
In 2018, the FISC turned to the scope of the search of communications collected under Section
702 and held, contrary to the amici who had been appointed in the case, that the query of the
communications did not constitute a separate Fourth Amendment search event subject to its
own reasonableness analysis.406 Nevertheless, under a totality of the circumstances test, the
court arrived at the same conclusion as the amici, which was that the FBI query procedures
being proposed were unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment.407 For the court, the privacy
interests were substantial, as “the FBI has conducted tens of thousands of unjustified queries
of Section 702 data.”408 Judge Boasberg noted that “the reported querying practices present a
serious risk of unwarranted intrusion into the private communications of a large number of
U.S. persons.” 409 The court explained:
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The goal of the Fourth Amendment is to protect individuals from arbitrary
governmental intrusions on their privacy. . . . The FBI’s use of unjustified queries
squarely implicates that purpose: the FBI searched for, and presumably examined
when found, private communications of particular U.S. persons on arbitrary grounds
. . . . The government is not at liberty to do whatever it wishes with those U.S.-person
communications, notwithstanding that they are “incidental collections occurring as
a result of” authorized acquisitions.410
In re Directives had relied on the assurance that the government does not maintain a database
of incidentally-collected information. Here, however, not only was there a database, but the
FBI was regularly querying it.
In 2011, the FISC similarly determined that intrusion caused by the NSA's targeting and
minimization procedures, as related to its acquisition of Internet multi-communication
transactions (MCTs) authorized by Section 702, was not reasonable under Fourth
Amendment.411 The NSA was acquiring a large number (i.e., tens of thousands) of Fourth
Amendment-protected MCTs that had no direct connection to any targeted facility, and thus
did not serve national security needs underlying FISA. The government’s proposed handling
of MCTs tended to maximize retention of such information and hence to enhance risk that it
would be used and disseminated.412
The NSA amended its procedures, which the court subsequently approved as consistent with
the Fourth Amendment.413 The new version addressed different types of MCTs, based on
whether the active user was the target, and, if not, the nationality and location (to the extent
known) of the active user. It provided for the more problematic categories of MCTs to be
sequestered and instituted a shorter retention period put into place, whereby an MCT of any
type could not be retained more than 2 years after expiration of certification under which it
was acquired, unless applicable retention criteria met.414 The provisions categorically
prohibited NSA analysis from using known U.S. person identifiers to query the results of
upstream Internet collection.415 The protections, such as they were, proved short-lived.416
E. Fifth Amendment (Due Process)
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The final area of constitutional adjudication has to do with Fifth Amendment due process.
Only one case, from 2014, appears to address it. There, the court denied a motion for disclosure
of prior FISC decisions on the grounds that “neither FISA nor the . . . [FISC] Rules of
Procedure . . . require, or provide for discretionary, disclosure of the Requested Opinions in
the circumstances of this case,” and determined that the due process clause “does not compel
the requested disclosure.”417 Instead, it requires the court to review an application, order, and
other materials relating to ELSUR in camera or ex parte if the Attorney General’s affidavit
indicates that disclosure would harm national security. Disclosure may only occur where it is
necessary to make an accurate determination of the legality of the surveillance.418
V. Cluster 4: Process and Compliance
The fourth and final cluster of FISC/FISCR opinions centers on the tension between public
and private accountability. They reveal that the government continually pushes the boundaries
set by the court and Congress, at times crossing them entirely. The courts, caught in the middle,
have to work to ensure compliance, further underscoring how much their roles have altered
since 1978. While some of the transgressions have been minor, others have had a tremendous
impact on citizens’ rights, making it even more important that the courts’ determinations be
made public. In a democratic state, it is critical that the people know how the government is
using powers it has been afforded. It is all the more important when the government
inadvertently, or at times deliberately, flouts judicial orders—and then (as discussed in Part
IV, supra) attempts to prevent findings revealing malfeasance from reaching light of day.
As a practical matter, the FISC has had to account for irregularities in regard to special
minimization procedures, as well as SMPs and targeting and querying procedures. It has
confronted inaccurate, materially omitted, erroneous, and false statements by the government.
And it has found itself in a data dilemma: what to do with information (which the government
asks to retain and continue to use) obtained outside statutory authority or requirements put into
place by the courts. Efforts by the government to request that the court approve such behavior
borders on pushing the FISC to issue an Advisory Opinion – well outside the bounds of Article
III.
While earlier in its history, the FISC appears to have been more deferential to the government,
it has become less patient in light of the government’s repeated failure to comply with judicial
direction and submission of inaccurate and false statements to the court.
A. SMPs/Minimization
FISA requires that the court ensures that the intrusiveness of electronic intercepts and physical
search is consistent with the need to collect foreign intelligence information from foreign
powers and their agents.419 The first time judicial concerns appears to have arisen in regard to
SMPs appears to have been in In re All Matters.420 The court rejected the government’s
proposed 2002 minimization procedures because it would have empowered criminal
prosecutors to “advise FBI intelligence officials concerning the initiation, operation,
417
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continuation, or expansion of FISA searches or surveillance,” allowing the government to use
FISA primarily for a law enforcement purpose.421 In In re Sealed Case, as the prior section
noted, the FISCR overturned the lower court.
Similar process questions arose in 2004, when the FISC determined that the government could
not mark the identities of non-target U.S. persons during the retention process for the purpose
of facilitating subsequent retrieval of those persons’ communications.422 The SMPs did not
allow for using alternative or additional means of recording identities of those not party to a
communications. The government practice therefore violated the procedures.423
Again in 2007, the government tried to convince the FISC that alternative, extra-statutory
minimization procedures met the requirements. In this case, the NSA was unilaterally
initiating surveillance of foreign telephone numbers or e-mail addresses without express
judicial approval—even after the fact.424 The court rejected the practice. According to Judge
Roger Vinson, it failed to follow either the letter or the spirit of the statute.425
Perhaps nowhere has the pressure on the court from the government to expand what is allowed
under the minimization procedures been more evident than in the Section 702 context, which
ten opinions address. A clear tension between the statutory prohibition on intentionally
targeting and incidental collection of U.S. persons’ communications exists. The matter appears
to have first come to the fore in a 2008 opinion authored by Judge McLaughlin. At that point,
the court went with the government representation, finding the minimization procedures
sufficient.426 The statute’s prohibition on intentionally targeting a U.S. person or someone
within the U.S. still permitted the retention of mistaken, but reasonable beliefs that the target
was a non-U.S. person outside the U.S. 427
In 2010, Judge Bates again confronted a similar question.428 But his most consequential
decision came in October 2011, when he ruled that the NSA's minimization procedures, in
relation to its upstream collection of internet MCTs, were not reasonably designed to minimize
retention of non-publicly-available information concerning nonconsenting U.S. persons, given
that the NSA did not limit access to specially-trained analysts or require those analysts to mark
relevant portions of MCTs.429 In that opinion, as discussed in Part IV, supra, Judge Bates ruled
that the intrusion caused by NSA's targeting and minimization procedures, as related to its
acquisition of Internet MCTs authorized by Section 702, was not reasonable under the Fourth
Amendment.
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The reason the practice failed constitutional muster was because the NSA had been acquiring
a large number—tens of thousans—of Fourth Amendment-protected MCTs that had no direct
connection to any targeted facility and thus did not serve national security purpose. Its
proposed handling of MCTs, moreover, tended “to maximize the retention of such information
and hence to enhance risk that it would be used and disseminated.”430
In the following month, November 2011, the court approved amended minimization
procedures and Section 702 collection resumed.431 The additional measures related to:
(1) the post-acquisition segregation of those types of transactions that are most likely
to contain non-target information concerning United States persons or persons in the
United States; (2) special handling and marking requirements for transactions that
have been removed from or that are not subject to segregation; and (3) a two-year
default retention period for all upstream acquisitions.432
Numerous opinions approve ELSUR/Physical surveillance SMPs as well as those adopted in
the Section 702 context.433 These, and other rulings, demonstrate a steady pattern of special
amendments and exceptions that expand access to information obtained via FISA. In 2012, for
example, the government obtained permission for the FBI to provide the National
Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) with raw data relating to international terrorism (as opposed
to derivative information) and to permit NCTC to review, retain, and disseminate such
information.434 The same year, the NSA amended their minimization procedures to allow for
the sharing of unminimized communications obtained from Internet Service Providers.435 The
following year, the FISC accepted further amendments to the § 702 procedures.436 The court
approved new FBI SMPs to allow for the storage of unminimized FISA-acquired information
in “ad hoc” FBI databases that do not comply with Section III of the minimization
procedures.437 The purpose was to enable FBI personnel to review and analyze the
information, which apparently could not be completed within the compliant systems.438
The steady expansion continued. In 2014, the government amended SMPs for ELSUR and
physical search to allow for the dissemination to the National Center for Missing and Exploited
Children (NCMEC) for law enforcement purposes, and to exempt information from removal
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that might be required for litigation-related reasons.439 The FISC also approved amendments
to allow the FBI to retain information longer than the normal retention period if considered
necessary for administrative, civil, or criminal litigation, as long as the Bureau informed the
court.440 And in 2017, the court approved extending the retention periods for upstream
collection from two years to five years.441 Part of the rationale at the time was that the scope
of upstream acquisition had narrowed from TFA to only communications to or from a selector
associated with the target; however, this condition is subject to change at the discretion of the
Executive with just thirty days’ notice to Congress (and no notice in exigent circumstances).
The pattern that emerges is one familiar to scholars who focus on the history of surveillance:
the steady expansion of the type of information obtained, the purposes to which it is put, and
the government agencies with whom it is shared.
B. Targeting442
While numerous FISC opinions have found Section 702 targeting procedures consistent with
the statutory and constitutional requirements, there has been a significant amount of concern
generated by the government’s effort to expand targeting to communications not just to or
from a target, but also about a target or a selector associated with a target.443
The first engagement with to/from/about (TFA) collection in the Section 702 context appears
in a 2008 opinion, in which Judge McLaughlin determined that the procedures were
reasonably designed to ensure that the users of tasked selectors are reasonably believed to be
abroad, and to prevent the intentional acquisition of about communications to which the
sender and all intended recipients were known to be inside the U.S.444 The agencies could
reach out to foreign governments for technical and linguistic assistance.445
In 2009, the court had to address an overcollection issue in which the government argued that
the procedures, not implementation, mattered. The Section 702 submissions indicated that the
government would be collecting telephone and internet communications. For the former, the
targeting would only be to/from; for the latter, it would be TFA, to ensure the collection of
communications that would contain a reference to the name of the tasked account.446 While
439
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substantial implementation problems could speak to whether targeting procedures were
reasonably designed, statutory compliance was merely a matter of procedure. 447 Judge
McLaughlin rejected the government’s approach and took the actual instance of overcollection
on board.448
The following year, Judge Bates held that the enhanced and remedial measures for NSA’s
failure to effectively purge databases of Section 1881a information required under
minimization procedures, and NSA’s backlog in conducting post-targeting review of selectors
for which NSA had indications such selectors might have been used within the U.S., were
adequate to address concerns.449 The court determined that the relatively few post-tasking
review problems compared to the total number of tasking decisions, coupled with the limited
duration of any improper taskings in those cases, and the assurance that the process has been
improved, did not undermine basis for approval of targeting and minimization procedures.450
Although the court in April 2011 approved the Section 702 submissions, the following month,
on May 2, the government filed a supplemental letter disclosing that NSA’s upstream
collection included the acquisition of entire transactions, which “may contain data that is
wholly unrelated to the tasked selector, including the full content of discrete communications
that are not to, from, or about the facility tasked for collection.”451 The NSA had significantly
exceeded approved scope of collection.
In October 2011, Judge Bates wrote, “the Court is troubled that the government’s revelations
regarding NSA’s acquisition of Internet transactions mark the third instance in less than three
years in which the government has disclosed a substantial misrepresentation regarding the
scope of a major collection program.”452 It turned out that the NSA had been acquiring Internet
transactions since before the Court approved the first Section 702 certification in 2008.453 This
information spurred Judge Bates to observe that FISA makes it a crime “(1) to ‘engage[] in
electronic surveillance under color of law except as authorized’ by statute or (2) to ‘disclose[]
or use[] information obtained under color of law by electronic surveillance, knowing or having
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reason to know that the information was obtained through electronic surveillance not
authorized’ by statute.454
Although the Court had authorized acquisition of certain categories of “about”
communications, moreover, dating from McLaughlin’s 2009 opinion, the NSA had been
collecting all of them: “The Court now understands that all ‘about’ communications are
acquired by means of NSA’s acquisition of Internet transactions through its upstream
collection.455
In addition, as aforementioned in the Fourth Amendment analysis, the NSA was not just
collecting discreet communications, but also “internet transactions”—including some that
include a single, discrete communication (single communication transaction or SCT) as well
as MCTs. Judge Bates wrote, “[F]or the first time, the government has now advised the Court
that the volume and nature of the information it has been collecting is fundamentally different
from what the Court has been led to believe.”456 As a result, the NSA was knowingly collecting
tens of thousands of entirely domestic communications—precisely the types of
communications prohibited by statute.
The government reached for a familiar trope, arguing that the technology was insufficient to
know at moment of collection whether the transaction is a SCT or MCT, or to identify parties
to any particular communication within the transaction.457 The court had previously
understood—from the government—that it could use technical measures to prevent
acquisition of entirely domestic communications. The expansion basically meant that the NSA
had, “as a practical matter, circumvented the spirit” of the law.458
The issues did not end in 2011. Five years later, the government again informed the court of
significant noncompliance with NSA and FBI querying procedures.459 A subsequent hearing
proved insufficient to address the court’s concerns and to assess the procedures submitted with
the certifications.460 Although the executive branch made further submissions in January 2017,
discussing what it was doing to try to even understand the scope and the causes of the
compliance issues, and to propose potential solutions, the court still did not find that the
government had adequately ascertained the scope of the issues.461
Unable to address the problem with TFA and under pressure from the court, the government
agreed to sequester and then to destroy raw upstream Internet data previously collected and to
substantially narrow to breadth of information collected upstream. “Most significantly,” the
court explained, “the government will eliminate ‘abouts’ collection altogether, which will
have the effect of eliminating acquisition of the more problematic types of MCTs.”462 The
government would make quarterly report s to the court over the next year as it undertook the
454
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process. Under the amended procedures, the NSA could still acquire MCTs, but only when it
could ensure that the target was an active user (i.e., a party to the entire MCT).463
The opinion was issued April 26, 2017, and released the same day. Two days later, the NSA
announced that it was choosing to eliminate the upstream data—without explaining that the
NSA had been collecting information outside of either statutory or constitutional constraints
for seven years.464
The public about-face and release of the court opinion underscored the already heightened
public concern about TFA. Accordingly, the FISA Amendments Reauthorization Act of 2017
limited the acquisition of “communications that contain a reference to, but are not to or from,
a target of an acquisition authorized” under Section 702.465 The statute provided for the
government to resume abouts collection with 30 days’ notice to Congress, with an exception
for exigent circumstances.466 In the interim, the government must “fully and currently inform”
the Judiciary and Intelligence Committees of the House and Senate of “significant
noncompliance . . . concerning any acquisition of abouts communications.”467 In light of the
narrowing of abouts collection, the querying provisions broadened.
C. Querying
Both the § 215 bulk collection program and § 702 upstream collection have been beset by
concerns about the querying procedures and the government’s violation of judicial orders.
According to the FISC, in March 2009, the NSA telephony bulk collection under § 215 was
“premised on a flawed depiction of how the NSA uses [the acquired] metadata.”468 The
misperception by FISC started from day one, in May 2006, “buttressed by repeated inaccurate
statements made in the government’s submissions, and despite a government-devised and
Court-mandated oversight regime.”469 Contrary to the government’s repeated assurances, the
NSA had been routinely running queries of the metadata using terms that did not meet the
required standard of reasonable, articulable, suspicion (RAS). The Court concluded that
requirement had been “so frequently and systemically violated that it can fairly be said that
this critical element of the overall . . . regime has never functioned effectively.”470
In regard to § 702, as aforementioned, in October 2016, the government informed the court
that it had been violating the restrictions established by Bates in 2011 that forbade using U.S.
person identifiers to query upstream data. As the court explained in 2017: “The October 26,
2016 Notice informed the Court that NSA analysts had been conducting such queries in
violation of that prohibition, with much greater frequency than had previously been disclosed
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to the Court.”471 Preliminary reports by the NSA inspector general suggested that the problem
was widespread.472 The government had not been forthright: as Judge Collyer explained, “The
full scope of non-compliant querying practices had not been previously disclosed to the
Court.”473 The court considered it an institutional “lack of candor,” and noted it was “a very
serious Fourth Amendment issue.”474
Even as the government was forced to jettison TFA collection, it pressed the court to allow it
to begin querying upstream data using known U.S. person identifiers, subject to a requirement
that the facts establishing the use of any such identifier as a selection term was reasonably
likely to return foreign intelligence information.475 The court agreed with the amended
procedures, stating that it was satisfied that the same restrictions applied as existed in regard
querying other forms of 702-acquired data (which Bates had said was acceptable in his
October. 3, 2011 memorandum opinion).476
The 2017 FISA Amendments Reauthorization Act, in addition to limiting TFA, also provided
new measures to address querying procedures, requiring that they be “consistent with the
requirements of the fourth amendment . . . for information collected.”477 Under the statute, a
“query” means “the use of one or more terms to retrieve the unminimized contents or
noncontents located in electronic and data storage systems of communications of or
concerning United States persons obtained through acquisitions authorized” under § 702
certification.478
In prior years, minimization procedures for § 702 included rules for querying raw data.479 But
following introduction of the new statute, the AG and DNI adopted separate querying
procedures for each agency.480 Under all of them, a U.S. person (USP) query term is defined
as “a term that is reasonably likely to identify one or more specific” USPs which “may be
either a single item of information or information that, when combined with other information,
471

Memorandum Opinion and Order, [REDACTED], No. [REDACTED], GID.C.00130, at 19 (FISA Ct. Apr.
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See id. at 28–29.
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477 FISA Amendments Reauthorization Act of 2017, Pub. L. No. 115-118, §§ 101(a)(1), 702(f)(1)(A), 132 Stat. 3,
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is reasonably likely to identify one or more specific” USPs.481 Depending on context, names
or unique titles, government-associated personal or corporate identification numbers, street
addresses, or telephone numbers, could all constitute USP query terms.482 The FISC
determines whether such procedures satisfy the statutory requirements.483
Under certain circumstances, the government must obtain a FISC order prior to accessing §
702-acquired information.484 This applies only to the FBI (and not to the CIA, NSA, or NCTC)
for queries made using a USP query term that was not designed to find or to extract foreign
intelligence information.485 The court order to access contents is further limited to queries
made “in connection with a predicated criminal investigation opened by the [FBI] that does
not relate to the national security of the United States.”486 Thus, the FBI cannot query § 702
data for domestic law enforcement purposes, and review the metadata of any returns, but it
cannot examine the substance without FISC approval. The FBI does not have to go to the court
if it determines there is a reasonable belief that the contents could help to mitigate/eliminate a
threat to life or serious bodily harm.487
The 2017 Reauthorization Act also introduced a new requirement that the querying procedures
“include a technical procedure whereby a record is kept of each [USP] query term used for a
query.”488 Despite the plain language of the statute, in 2018 and 2019, the FISC was again
forced to address the government’s effort to resist restrictions on querying the data.
In the first review of the new procedures, the court found that the FBI’s proposed measures
did not comply with record-retention provisions.489 The FBI argued that because it kept all the
terms used to query the database, it did not need to specify which ones were USP-specific.490
Judge Boasberg made it clear that to meet the statutory requirement, a log must be kept. The
FBI querying and minimization procedures were further inconsistent with both the statutory
minimization requirements and Fourth Amendment in that they failed to “require adequate
documentation of the justifications for queries that use United States-person query
information.”491
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The FBI had had several non-compliance issues since April 2017 in which FBI queries were
not reasonably likely to return foreign intelligence information or evidence of a crime.492 The
court also noted some new non-compliance issues.493
Dissatisfied with the FISC’s ruling, the government appealed to the FISCR, which agreed with
FISC’s determination. The proposed query procedures failed to comply with the plain
statutory language.494 Because the result required amendment of the procedures, the court did
not reach whether the proposed query and minimization procedures complied with FISA and
the Fourth Amendment.495
The case therefore came back to the FISC with amended procedures that acknowledged the
FBI’s statutory responsibility to keep a record of all U.S. person query terms.496 Further
amendments required that “[p]rior to reviewing the unminimized contents of section 702acquired information retrieved using a United States person query term,” FBI personnel must
“provide a written statement of facts showing that the query was reasonably likely to retrieve
foreign intelligence information or evidence of a crime.”497 The court held that this met
statutory and 4th Amendment requirements and agreed to an implementation strategy,
requiring a written report by September 26, 2019 and every 45 days thereafter until the FBI
fully complied.498
As a result of the legislation and the court’s opinions, each agency’s querying procedures now
require the agency to “generate and maintain an electronic record of each United States person
query term used for a query of unminimized information acquired pursuant to section 702.”499
The records are retained for at least five years. The CIA, NCTC, and FBI require that users
record the query term(s) used, the date of the query, and who ran the inquiry.500 The NSA
retains the query term(s) used or approved; date of query/approval of query terms; identity of
the user who conducted query or sought approval; and, for content queries, the approving
official in NSA OGC office, as well as the duration of the approval.501
D. Erroneous Statements and Material Omissions
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About a dozen opinions in the public domain raise concern about inaccurate, materially
omitted, erroneous, or false statements to the court. Although the Russia investigation attracted
a significant amount of attention in recent years, the problem did not begin there. Indeed, it
started before the September 11 attacks.
In March 2000, the government informed the FISC that it had been disseminating FISA
information to criminal squads in the FBI and U.S. Attorney’s Office without the required
authorizations of the Court in four or five separate cases.502 This was followed in September
2000, with the government confessing to errors in 75 separate FISA applications related to
major terrorist attacks, including:
a) an erroneous statement in the FBI Director's FISA certification that the target of
the FISA was not under criminal investigation; b) erroneous statements in the FISA
affidavits of FBI agents concerning the separation of the overlapping intelligence
and criminal investigations, and the unauthorized sharing of FISA information with
FBI criminal investigators and assistant U.S. attorneys; and, c) omissions of material
facts from FBI FISA affidavits relating to a prior relationship between the FBI and a
FISA target, and the interview of a FISA target by an assistant U.S. attorney.503
The government reported similar misstatements in another series of applications, transgressing
the wall between intelligence collection and criminal investigations: all of the agents involved
participated in the same squad, with screening done not by the Office of Intelligence Policy
Review, but by a supervisor simultaneously overseeing both investigations.504 The court,
however, did not take a strong stance on these violations.505
The modern era has fared little better in terms of government submissions. Even the practice
of reporting noncompliance has failed to comport with the requirements. In 2009, for example,
the court noted that the government had been picking and choosing what it decided to reveal
to the court, omitting, for instance, failures to de-task accounts even after the NSA discovered
that the targets had entered the United States.506 The court had to order the government to
report every compliance incident that relates to the operation of the targeting or minimization
procedures.507
In another case, the government misdescribed the actual scope of what it was collecting under
Title I.508 It was far from the first time. The court wryly noted:
The government has exhibited a chronic tendency to mis-describe the actual scope
of NSA acquisitions in its submissions to this Court. These inaccuracies have
previously contributed to unauthorized electronic surveillance and other forms of
502
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statutory and constitutional deficiency. It is evident that the government needs every
incentive to provide accurate and complete information to the Court about NSA
operations, whenever such information is material to the case.509
Once again, the court ordered the government to submit a report of its effort in identifying and
purging information obtained from the acquisition.510
The executive branch has made inaccurate representations to the court about the post-tasking
review process.511 There are numerous other examples.512 These are in addition to the queries
of § 215 metadata being run absent RAS, the bulk collection of Internet metadata outside the
scope of the FISC’s orders, and Judge Bates’s now famous October 2011 opinion noting that
the government had made substantial misrepresentations regarding the scope of § 702.513
Getting caught does not necessarily alleviate the problem. In 2012, for instance, the court
reiterated its concern about NSA misrepresentations regarding upstream collection.514 The
issue did not abate: the court was surprised to learn by notice in July 2015 that the NSA had
not been deleting overcollected Section 702 records placed on the Master Purge List in
accordance with a May 2011 Opinion and Order.515 The court was also dismayed that it took
the government four years of continued retention before proposing a resolution to the court.516
The government further informed the court about two NSA databases that were not compliant
with minimization procedures.517 This was all prior to the October 26, 2016 hearing in which
Collyer lamented the NSA’s query of § 702 data using USP identifiers despite the prohibition
in the minimization procedures, noting the government’s “lack of candor” and the serious
constitutional questions thereby raised.518
The most prominent example of government malfeasance arises in the context of the Russian
investigations. The FBI opened Crossfire Hurricane on July 31, 2016 to determine whether
individuals associated with the Trump campaign were either wittingly or unwittingly
coordinating with the Russian government’s efforts to interfere in the 2016 presidential
election.519 The investigation came on the heels of a foreign government informing the
administration that George Papadopoulos (a campaign adviser) had indicated that Russia had
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reached out to the Trump team to offer to release information that would be damaging to the
democratic candidate.520
On December 9, 2019, Justice Department Inspector General Michael Horowitz completed a
twenty-month inquiry into Crossfire Hurricane and the investigation of four members of the
presidential campaign: Papadopoulos, Carter Page, Paul Manafort, and Michael Flynn.521
Having poured over more than one million documents held by the DOJ and FBI and
undertaken more than 170 interviews with more than 100 witnesses, Horowitz found
significant discrepancies between law, policy, and practice.522
In regard to the FISC applications for Title I surveillance of Carter Page, the IG found that the
first application in October 2016, and the three renewal orders thereafter, which resulted in
about eleven months of surveillance, was premised in part on a dossier provided by
Christopher Steele.523 Steele, a former intelligence officer, had formed a consulting firm that
specialized in corporate intelligence and investigative services. In 2016, Steele was hired by a
Washington, D.C. investigative firm to do political opposition research into the Russian role
in the election. The reports that he produced for them became known as the Steele dossier.
From July through October 2016, Steele passed several of these reports on to the FBI, which
failed to press him on either his funding source, or his role in a Yahoo! News article focused
on ties between Trump advisor and Kremlin.524
In his report, Horowitz launched a scathing critique of the investigation. The applications to
the FISC for surveillance of Page left out information that cut against FBI or was inconsistent
with what they were telling the court that went directly to probable cause. The FISC Rules of
Procedure required that the Page applications contain all material facts. 525 Although they did
not define “material,” FBI policy considered that a fact was “material” where it was relevant
to the court’s probable cause determination.526 The Woods procedures also required that all
factual statements in FISA application be “scrupulously accurate.”527 It turned out that the
application relied on four assertions from the Steele dossier, none of which was corroborated
by other information—and none of which was made clear to the FISC.528 In addition, the
520
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application contained seven further inaccuracies and omissions, none of which were brought
up at any of the renewals, at which point ten addition omissions of fact, misstatements, and
significant errors occurred.529
Horowitz expressed concern, “That so many basic and fundamental errors were made by three
separate, hand-picked teams on one of the most sensitive FBI investigations that was briefed
to the highest levels within the FBI, and that FBI officials expected would eventually be
subjected to close scrutiny, raised significant questions regarding the FBI chain of command's
management and supervision of the FISA process.”530
As if those discoveries were not enough, Horowitz found that an FBI lawyer, Kevin
Clinesmith, had falsified an email from the CIA to state that Page was not a source for the
agency, resulting in assuaging concerns that the declarant had about whether there was such a
source relationship. As a result, nothing in the application indicated that there might be a
relationship between Page and the CIA—information that went directly to the probable cause
determination of whether Page was an agent of a foreign power.531 Horowitz went on to report
that the agents had not shared pertinent information with key DOJ and FBI officials, with the
result that DOJ leadership “did not have accurate and complete information at the time they
approved the applications.”532 Horowitz was so concerned about the findings that he initiated
a second audit focused on FBI compliance with the Woods procedures in FISA applications
targeting USPs in counterintelligence and counterterrorism investigations.533
The report shook congressional confidence in FISA, with the failure to include exculpatory
evidence hearkened as a Fifth Amendment due process concern. Political leaders took aim at
the court. Sen. Lindsey Graham announced, “I’m a pretty hawkish guy, but if the court doesn’t
take corrective action and do something about being manipulated and lied to, you will lose my
support. . . . I would hate to lose the ability of [FISC] to operate at a time, probably when we
need it the most. But after your report, I have serious concerns about whether the FISA court
can continue unless there is fundamental reform.”534
The FISC took the offensive: on December 5, 2019, Collyer issued a classified order directing
the government to identify all matters before the FISC on which Clinesmith had worked. 535
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Less than a fortnight later, the court issued an unclassified order rebuking the FBI over their
actions and noting that the agency had failed to fulfill the “heightened duty of candor” that
accompanies in camera, ex parte applications.536 Collyer wrote, “The frequency with which
representations made by FBI personnel turned out to be unsupported or contradicted by
information in their possession, and with which they withheld information detrimental to their
case, calls into question whether information contained in other FBI applications is
reliable.”537 She ordered the government to inform the court what it had done to address the
errors and to ensure that similar inaccuracy and omissions did not happen again.538 She also
previously raised the question about any other matters involving Clinesmith and whether any
bar association or disciplinary referrals had been made.539
The FBI responded with an unclassified submission to the court laying out its approach going
forward.540 Judge Boasberg, who had become Presiding Judge of the FISC at the turn of the
new year, appointed former DOJ National Security Division Assistant Attorney General David
Kris as amicus curiae to assist court in evaluating government’s response.541 Kris found the
proposed measures insufficient and recommended several ways to expand and mprove
assurances.542 Soon after, the FISC declassified the order about the DOJ’s handling of the Page
application.543
In early March 2020, the FISC issued one of its strongest opinions to date, responding to
government malfeasance. Judge Boasberg noted, “There is . . . little doubt that the government
breached its duty of candor to the Court with respect to [the Carter Page] applications.”544 The
frequency and seriousness of the misstatements to the Court called into question the reliability
of other FBI information contained in applications.545 Separate classified proceedings were
underway dealing with how to sequester information acquired pursuant to the four FISA
authorizations concerning Page.546 Boasberg highlighted problems with reliance on the Steele
dossier, and he analyzed and proposed remedial actions relating to the FISA application
procedures, improvements in training and other institutional changes, and greater oversight.547
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The FISC ordered that the government provide details on the new changes, training, audit, and
compliance mechanisms.548 It banned any DOJ or FBI personnel “under disciplinary or
criminal review relating to their work on FISA applications [to] participate in drafting,
verifying, reviewing, or submitting such applications to the court.”549 Beginning March 9,
2020, the court required that all Title I/III, PRTT, Section 1881b or Section 1881c applications
include a statement verifying that the application fairly reflected “all information that might
reasonably call into question the accuracy of the information or the reasonableness of any FBI
assessment in the application, or otherwise raise doubts about the requested findings.”550 From
the FBI in particular, the Court required an additional statement attesting that the Justice
Department’s Office of Intelligence had “been apprised of all information that might
reasonably call into question the accuracy of the information or the reasonableness of any FBI
assessment in the application, or otherwise raise doubts about the requested findings.”551
Soon after the FISC issued its order, another memorandum from Horowitz came out, having
examined 29 separate FISC applications targeting USPs between 2014–19.552 Remarkably,
every single one of the applications had errors.553 The Woods procedures were not being
followed in all of the cases; indeed, in at least four cases, there were no files at all backing up
the application.554 In those cases where there were files, some facts were not supported or
corroborated by the documentation, or there were inconsistent claims being made to the FISC.
On average, each application had approximately 20 issues, with up to 65 issues in just one of
the applications examined.555
Within a week of the publication of the IG report, the FISC issued an order to the government
directing it to provide the court with the names of the targets and docket numbers for the 29
applications reviewed by the OIG and specify which targets/docket numbers correspond to the
4 applications where there was no Woods file.556 The government had to assess to what extent
the 29 applications involved material misstatements or omissions, and whether any such
material misstatements and omissions rend authorizations granted by the court for that target
548
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invalid.557 By June 15, 2020, the government was to make sworn submission reporting on
conduct and results of the assessment—including where determined not to render applications
invalid.558 The order further required from June 15, 2020 onward that every two months the
government provide a progress report on the Woods files for all dockets on or after January
2015.559
E. Overcollection and the Data Dilemma
Overcollection is, as has already been noted, a consistent problem in the government’s
implementation of FISA. It appears to affect nearly every area of collection.
In 2010, for instance, unauthorized surveillance under Title I lasted between fifteen months
and three years, resulting in what appears to be thousands of improperly intercepted
communications.560 The communications obtained were “presumably . . . unrelated to
[redacted] or any other subject of foreign intelligence interest.” 561 In that case, Judge Scullin
ordered the government to report on whether all of the information obtained had been
destroyed (with limited exceptions) and how SMPs would apply to proposed retention.562 The
following year, assumedly because it hadn’t been destroyed, the same judge ordered that it be
eliminated and prohibited any further use or disclosure of the information.563
In another case, the government collected too much information as part of its bulk collection
of Internet metadata under the PRTT provisions. The government did not come clean until
August 11, 2009—five years after it had been adopted; nevertheless, the problem persisted.564
In 2008, the government reported overcollection in the context of Section 702.565 While the
NSA had apparently implemented measures to filter out non-targeted communications prior
to the communications entering repositories accessible to analysts,566 in 2010 it emerged that
the NSA had failed to purge databases of § 1881a information required under minimization
procedures and had a backlog on post-targeting review of selectors.567 Information that should
have been deleted possibly ended up in reports disseminated by NSA.568
In 2011, the government proposed in regard to a Title I application that it be allowed to retain
the fruits of unlawful surveillance.569 The court was surprised to learn four years later that the
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NSA still had not been deleting overcollected § 702 records placed on the master purge list in
accordance with a May 2011 Opinion and Order.570
These and other cases point to what could be termed the data dilemma, which really has two
constituent parts: first, what to do with communications intercepted outside the statutory and
judicial restrictions; second, how to ensure that the government does with the information
what it has been told to do. The courts’ roles in both regards is very different than what it was
originally designed to do. In large part this stems from the programmatic nature of collection
under FISA—an instrument designed for more narrowly-targeted surveillance.
The data dilemma also gives rise to an associated concern, which is that the requests being put
to it by the government come perilously close to the line in terms of asking for Advisory
Opinions—an authority denied to Article III entities under the case-or-controversy
requirement.
VI. FISC/FISCR Jurisprudence Going Forward
Over the past two decades, the roles assumed by the FISC and FISCR have evolved well
beyond what Congress originally envisioned. Instead of just determining whether orders
should be issued for electronic surveillance, they have had to grapple with their authority as
Article III courts with specialized subject matter jurisdiction and to ascertain the extent to
which they can rely on their non-statutory, inherent powers. The tension between new and
emerging technologies and old statutory language has put the court into the position of having
to delve deeply into telecommunications, mobile computing, and network sciences. Tension
among ever more sweeping surveillance programs, national security concerns, and individual
rights has forced the court to address difficult constitutional questions.
Persistent misbehavior on the part of the government presents an increasingly difficult
challenge. Part of the problem derives from the ever more complex nature of the statutory and
regulatory regime, as well as the technologies involved. Legal and technical expertise have
historically been kept separate. More rigorous training and altering institutional arrangements,
such as embedding NSD attorneys in NSA operations, may go some way toward meeting this
challenge. But the underlying issue in some ways is much broader and relates to the decades
of specialization that mark expertise in these different areas. Conflict between the need for
discussion and protecting sensitive national security information further complicates the
picture.
Compounding the situation is the limited insight that the courts have into the inner workings
of the Executive Branch—a concern at times augmented by the government’s persistent
disregard of statutory and judicial limits. While FISA provides for criminal penalties, the court
and the Justice Department have been reluctant to invoke them. To the contrary, in a number
of cases of overcollection, the government has actively sought permission simply to keep the
data obtained outside statutory or judicial authorization.
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Going forward, one alternative may be for Congress to create an independent entity, with deep
technical expertise, which will allow for careful oversight of how the agencies conduct their
operations. Such an organization could be either attached to the court or to the agencies in
question, with an independent head of operations appointed by Congress—much like a
number of the offices of Inspectors General. Such entities would have the additional advantage
of providing a focal point for reporting, which has in many ways gotten out of control. Absent
an institutional fix, it falls to the FISC/FISCR, and to government attorneys acting in good
faith, for the system to work. Looked at in this light, the FISC’s recent actions following
Horowitz I and II were both necessary and important.
As we look toward the future, there are a few trends of note in terms of what we should expect
to see. First, the demand for FISC opinions will likely, if anything, increase. What is being
adjudicated is law, and the public does and will demand the right for access to it.
Simultaneously, it is likely that these opinions will continue to demonstrate the four tensions
identified in this Article. In addition, there may be movement in two key areas: first, notably
absent from the opinions that have been made public is information related to §§ 703-704.
Undoubtedly, this area, like the others, will fall subject to the concerns highlighted above.
Second, we have seen only two opinions, out of nearly 90, which deal with the associational
rights of the First Amendment. As non-specialized, geographically focused Article III courts
begin to wrestle more with these issues in the context of new and emerging technologies, in
light of FISA’s emphasis of First Amendment protected activities, it is likely that we will see
more discussion of these vital constitutional rights.
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